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EDITORIAL

CARDINAL HINSLEY's reiterated assertion that the Battle of Britain is a battle "for Christianity" (*tout court*) may not be so truly patriotic as he intends it to be. Some who did not at first question the assertion will have been tempted to do so, when they found that it was designed to imply an equation between the cause of General Franco in the Spanish Civil War and the cause of Great Britain in the present conflict.[1] There is more than one objection to that equation, but the fact alone that Germany and Italy, who *ex hypothesi* are now the champions of paganism, were by the same canon champions of Christianity then, suggests that the Cardinal possesses a degree of mental naivety which seldom goes with the Red Hat. Not only rationalists like Mr H. G. Wells have reason to protest against this definition of the British cause—on the ground, among others, that "nine-tenths of the British Empire is not even nominally Christian"[2]—but Christians themselves ought to see that, so far from being true of this particular war, that definition simply never could be true of any war.

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This is not at all to deny that Christians in Britain may support the present war or even that they are morally bound to do so. The question is whether, in doing so, they ought to believe and to say that they are "fighting for Christianity". For what does this mean? "Christianity" sounds a little less definite than "the Christian faith" or "the Church" or "the Gospel" or "the kingdom of God", but if it does not mean these things it is a word that is better not used at all. Canon Charles Smyth recently pointed out in these pages[3] that Christians are forbidden to fight for Christianity in this sense. We are not sure that any Christians really want to maintain the contrary, however loose and misleading may be the language that they use. On the other hand, by "fighting for Christianity"

[1] See *The Tablet*, August 24, p. 157. [2] See *The Guardian*, August 23, p. 408. [3] See THEOLOGY, July, 1940, p. 24.

some intend to say " fighting for Christian civilisation " or " fighting for Christendom ", which is quite a different proposition. But it is a proposition that, as Canon Smyth also pointed out, is of questionable applicability to the present conflict. For it implies that Christendom is still a going concern which has to be defended instead of a kind of social order which has in the future to be re-created.[1]

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It is therefore in our opinion better to avoid the expression " fighting for Christianity ", and indeed there is a basic and patriotic motive for the present war which Christians can endorse, although it is not peculiarly Christian. This was well stated in a recent issue of *The New English Weekly* :[2]

> We may know the house we call home to be built on insecure foundations and in an inferior, perhaps a vulgar, style, but it does not cease to be home for us on that account; we may have our own ambitions to improve it, but we will not tolerate that others should interfere to alter it for us. Every people that is truly alive cherishes the right to make its own history. Patriotism of such a simple sort . . . is not a crude and primitive instinct which the mature and sophisticated should strive to outgrow or to suppress; it is the mortar of honour and self-forgetfulness by which natural groupings of men are held together.

The Christian tradition has recognized that patriotism of this kind justifies a defensive war[3]; and if so, it is not necessary, although it may still be legitimate, to seek a more far-reaching justification.

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It is true that in the present conflict wider issues are at stake than the natural and rightful desire of the British people to determine its own destiny. But the understanding and definition of these issues is a much more complicated task than we are being encouraged to suppose, and it may be that no good purpose will be served at present by making

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[1] See J. H. Oldham, *The Resurrection of Christendom* and *The Christian News-Letter* (*passim*). [2] August 29. We take this opportunity of saying that *The New English Weekly* deserves to be more widely known and read by Christians than it is at present. The amount of its space which is devoted to the discussion of financial theory seems to us disproportionate, but that may be because we do not understand such matters and are unreasonably suspicious of those who profess to do so. Its comments on politics, literature and the arts are always worth reading. [3] Traditional teaching about " the just war " requires of course that other conditions shall be satisfied as well.

any particular definition the criterion of an orthodox attitude to the war. Any such definition, while it may afford relief and inspiration in one direction, is a source of further bewilderment in another. Even so apparently simple a statement as that Britain is fighting to win freedom and justice for the world is embarrassing as well as reassuring, as is illustrated by our inability to put out even a provisional statement of agreed, concrete and realistic peace aims.

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The last thing we want to deprecate is persistent thought about these wider issues. Quite the contrary. An unquestioning or a too ready acceptance of general or abstract propositions, such as that " we are fighting for Christianity ", will not only foster mental confusion, but prematurely relieve the strain of thought. This strain, as well as physical and spiritual hardship, we must surely be prepared to go on bearing, and all in an increasing measure for a long time to come. Christians in this country have by now decided where their immediate duty lies, but do we not need to be told that the Christian faith requires that that decision shall include an unshakeable resolution to bear the mental strain and distress of conscience which our historical destiny prescribes ? We must know that in ourselves we are not sufficient for these things. But faith enables us to see that it is the Christ Himself who in His mystical body wills to suffer through His members and that in this ordeal, as in every other, His grace will be found to be unfailing.

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Note.—Misadventures, due to the war, may cause considerable delay in the delivery of this and subsequent numbers of THEOLOGY.

William Law—Prophet and Saint

William Law was born in 1686 and died at the age of seventy-five in 1761. Bishop Butler was born in 1692, John Wesley in 1703, and Samuel Johnson in 1709. If asked, Who were the greatest intellects of England in the eighteenth century? most of us would give the last three names; few would include Law. Yet his biographer is justified in saying that in point of purely intellectual power he was superior to Wesley and Johnson. The fact is that, as he was for the most part a voice crying in the wilderness to the eighteenth century, the nineteenth century, except for an elect few like F. D. Maurice and Sterling, forgot him, and of course the twentieth century is above learning from anyone who lived in the old fundamentalist days. But honesty of character and consistency of principle can never be out of date, and when to these are added amazing acuteness and complete unselfishness we may yet have something to learn from William Law.

Born at the Northamptonshire village of Kings Cliffe of respectable parentage and well brought up—it is thought that Paternus and Eusebia in the *Serious Call* represent his parents—he never knew poverty, as Johnson did; but though his father died before he left Cambridge, he must always have had enough for subsistence, and his elder brother was well-to-do. Why, with his family tradition of Church and King, he went to the Puritan foundation of Emmanuel, associated in the seventeenth century with the distinguished Cambridge Platonists—now Law never mentioned Plato—we do not know. But he duly became a Fellow, took orders in 1711, and his M.A. in 1712. He then took pupils in Cambridge, and his one extant sermon was at a thanksgiving for the Peace of Utrecht, and contained a eulogy of Queen Anne. In a few months that good lady was no more, and then the ugly necessity of taking the oath of allegiance to the Hanoverian Succession, and of abjuration of the Stuarts, presented itself to the young fellow. Without hesitation, though it involved the entire abandonment of the career which lay before him with all its fair prospects, he became one of the second band of Non-jurors. But, unlike those of 1688, he was never a schismatic nor a political intriguer. He may have shared the sentimental attachment to the Stuarts of Samuel Johnson, and later of Queen Victoria,

but his act was simply one of obedience to conscience and adherence to principle. Few could have prophesied, and certainly not he himself, that by his writings he would exercise a wider influence than if the pulpit had remained open to him for the rest of his life. It is a probable inference that he soon left Cambridge for London: there is an unverified tradition that he was curate of St Mary-le-Strand, and, according to his disciple Okely, shortly before his death he spoke of a time when he was " curate in London ".

His first appearance in print was in 1717 and 1719, when Bishop Hoadly had raised the dreary Bangorian controversy by his sermon on the text " My kingdom is not of this world ". His three letters to the Bishop of Bangor remained unanswered; Dean Sherlock, afterwards Bishop of London, said it was because they were unanswerable. Certainly they showed, as F. D. Maurice said, a singularly able controversialist; no more powerful protest has ever been made against setting up the invisible Church against outward and visible ordinances. Once more, in 1737, he was to attack a book called *A Plain Account of the Nature and End of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper*, generally attributed to Hoadly, then Bishop of Winchester, but without going behind its anonymity: " Who this nameless author is neither concerns the truth, nor you, nor me, and therefore I leave the matter as he has left it." It is a powerful argument that this doctrine of the sacrament involves the rejection of the whole salvation of the gospel. Once again, in 1740, in his answer to Dr Trapp's *Discourse of the Folly, Sin and Danger of being Righteous overmuch*, he alludes to his *Letters to the Bishop of Bangor* having never been answered. Whether in the same treatise his ideal Bishop of Winchester who brought up his sons to trades and at death left them only £20, thereby putting an end to infidelity in his diocese, " tho' it was the largest in the Nation ", is an indirect hit at Hoadly, I doubt. In dealing with Trapp he refuses to give raillery for raillery.

> All the Triumph which the Doctor has gained over me by that flow of Wrath and Contempt which he has let loose upon me, I shall leave him quietly to enjoy.

Law hit hard in controversy and was extraordinarily clever in putting his opponent in the wrong, but he was scrupulously fair. Near the end of his life, when he attacked Dr Warburton's *Legation of Moses*, it was just the

same, hard-hitting but no abuse. Warburton, however, was far from observing the rule *De mortuis nil nisi bonum*, and really disgraced himself and the Episcopal Bench in his reply.

A much more useful task was accomplished by Law in confuting more pernicious books. As early as 1723 he put out a reply to Bernard Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees, or Private Vices, Publick Benefits*. Maurice thought this so powerful a vindication of morality that he re-edited it with an introduction in 1844; and the work was commended by Gibbon. In 1732 he answered Matthew Tindal's *Christianity as Old as the Creation*, and his argument won the praise of Leslie Stephen. To defend the Faith and to plead earnestly for it with unbelievers continued to be one of the main objects of his life. So we get *The Grounds and Reasons of Christian Regeneration or the New Birth as offered to the consideration of Christians and Deists* (1739) and his touching *Appeal to all that Doubt or Disbelieve the Truths of the Gospel, whether they be Deists, Arians, Socinians or Nominal Christians* (1740). Of course we cannot put these works in the same class with Bishop Butler's sermon (1726) and *Analogy* (1736), but we can say that he played a part along with the bishop in routing the Deists.

It seems impossible to say exactly when Law became an inmate of the Gibbon family house at Putney. The grandfather of the historian chose him as tutor to his elder son, perhaps in 1726. Law accompanied his pupil to Emmanuel and re-entered the walls he had left for conscience' sake eleven years before. The son seems to have been rather a feeble character; but on his sister, Hester, Law made a permanent impression, and the historian says: "In our family he left the reputation of a worthy and pious man who believed all that he professed and practised all that he enjoined." From Gibbon you must not expect higher praise than that. It is Law's singular glory that he lived the life he inculcated on others. Of how many Christians in all the ages can that be said? During these years he was writing the works on which his fame must chiefly rest, *A Practical Treatise upon Christian Perfection* (1726) and *A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life* (1729).

During these years John Wesley was repeatedly going to Putney for Law's counsel: "I was then a kind of oracle to him," said Law later, with a vein of humour. For in 1738 Wesley abandoned Law for Peter Böhler the Moravian, and

both found Law unsatisfactory. Though Wesley subsequently attacked his senior, "who was in Christ before him", he never lost his esteem for Law or forgot himself in controversy; indeed, he said all the Methodists were greatly profited by the book on Christian perfection. Neither Wesley nor Law, great Christians that they were, ever forgot that they were gentlemen. But it is not in any way disparaging Wesley to say of him that while he understood human nature, particularly that of the lower classes of society, as Law never did or could, he had much more of the practical common sense of the man of the world. The eighteenth-century England was hostile to what it called *enthusiasm*. Bishop Butler denounced it, and would not have dealings with Wesley for fear of it. Wesley himself half-heartedly commended it and ended by rejecting it (Sermon 37 on *Enthusiasm*). Law, in his uncompromising way, was the one eighteenth-century churchman who boldly defended it (IX, 309).[1]

> Enthusiasts we all are as certainly as we are Men . . . Enthusiasm is not blameable in Religion when it is true Religion that kindles it . . . when it is a Strong Persuasion and firm Belief of a continual Operation, Impression and Influence from above, when it is a Total Resignation to and Dependence upon the immediate Inspiration and Guidance of the Holy Spirit in the whole course of our lives; this is as sober and rational a Belief as to believe that we always live and move and have our Being in God. Both Nature and Scripture demonstrate this to be the true Spirit of a Religious Man.

The cautious man does not want to be led by the Spirit, as St Paul did, when he said that was the alternative to being under the Law. But nowadays what can have any success against Hitlerism and Bolshevism (both variations of enthusiasm) but a Christian enthusiasm?

Christian Perfection and *A Serious Call* are Law's contribution to enthusiasm. But if we look into it *carefully* we find it a very sane and sensible enthusiasm. "Christian Perfection is the right performance of our necessary duties, such as men in cloisters and religious retirement cannot add more and such as Christians in all states of the world must not be content with less." No double standard here; but a word on "*must not be content with less*". There is the rub. Is this fanaticism? This is Law's answer (VI, 237):

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[1] References are to Law's collected works in nine volumes (London, 1762).

This life that we have in this World from the Fall of *Adam*, is not to be naturally destroyed or murdered, nor are the Necessaries and Conveniences of Life to be rejected, nor is anyone to renounce his share in the Employments that are necessary and useful to social life; the Renunciation of the World reaches no further than the renouncing the Spirit, Temper and Inclinations of the worldly Life. We may stand in our Stations, when we stand in them as the Servants of God, as citizens of the New Jerusalem who have among earthly Things our Conversation in Heaven. We may keep our Possessions when we possess them as the Things of God, to use them not as Nature but as the Spirit directs us; when we do this we have the Poverty of Spirit which the Gospel requires, and come up to the very letter of that command given to the young Man *to sell all that he had and give to the Poor*."

Wesley once objected to Law's view of Christian duty as too high to be attainable. Law replied: " We shall do well to aim at the highest degree of perfection, if we may thereby at least attain to mediocrity." I am not sure whether this is the exact exegesis of perfection, but it is a very noble one, and no one has stated it better. Now the *Serious Call*, Gibbon said, " exposes with equal severity and truth the strange contradiction between the faith and practice of the Christian world ". Dr Johnson says that in early days:

> I became a sort of lax *talker* against religion, for I did not much *think* against it and this lasted till I went to Oxford, when I took up Law's *Serious Call to a Holy Life* expecting to find it a dull book. But I found Law quite an over-match for me; and this was the first occasion of my thinking in earnest.

It was, he said, the best piece of parænetic divinity, the finest piece of hortatory theology, in any language. To have contributed to make Johnson the Christian he was is no mean achievement.

How many others must have been stirred to thought of deeper things among the idle well-to-do to whom it was addressed. Wesley was the evangelist of the poor; Law was the prophet who preached to the idle and pleasure-loving well-to-do. The inimitable portraits of Flavia, Caelia, Felicianus, of Cognatus, Mundanus, Octavius, must have given offence to many. The portrait of Classicus has caused me many qualms; but at least it has taught me that a knowledge of Greek is no passport to heaven or substitute

for humility, self-renunciation and prayer. If I cannot quite follow Law in his hatred of the stage or his abstention from all light literature and poetry, I trust that I have learned from him not to neglect the pearl of great price.

Hitherto we have found Law only a high churchman of a very attractive type. Suddenly he becomes what would be described as a mystic, without, however, discarding any of his previous views. On to them he superposed not mysticism in general but the complete works of Jacob Behmen (or Böhme),[1] an illiterate shoemaker of Görlitz in the sixteenth century. So far as we can see, almost any mystic writer would have had the same effect on Law out of all those dealt with by Dr Inge in his epoch-making Bampton Lectures. What attracted him to Behmen was just the fact that he was a simple illiterate soul to whom the illumination from the Holy Spirit had come; here Law's instinctive fear of reason and intellect untouched by God comes in. For the rest of his life the supra-confessional element in Behmen, an orthodox Lutheran, made an orthodox Anglican rise above the limits of his confession. Anyhow it was Behmen who had this effect on Law. "I taught myself the High Dutch language", he says, "on purpose to know the original works of the blessed Jacob". He would fain have translated and edited the whole of Behmen's works. Though he did not live to carry out this plan, it was partly done in 1780 by his disciple Okely. The strange thing is that he swallowed Behmen whole; and the result is *The Spirit of Prayer* (1749-50), *The Way to Divine Knowledge* (1762), and *The Spirit of Love* (1762-64), and for the rest of his life was happy in having acquired a fresh illumination.

I have not fully read these works of Law, not because I think them pernicious, but because they are much more the works of Behmen than of Law. One's thoughts go back to the great Tertullian, who after having written powerful Catholic treatises suddenly became a Montanist and a schismatic. Does the comparison fit? Now at least Law was never a schismatic; on the contrary, he claimed to hold all his former views as to Church doctrine, only to

[1] For interesting details about the book which introduced Behmen to Law, see *Journal of Theological Studies*, XXXVII (1936), pp. 350-68; Mr Stephen Hobhouse has discovered that the book *Fides et Ratio collatæ* was written by Wolf Freiherr von Metternich (1660-1731). It was a confutation of Locke and was edited by P. Poriet (Amsterdam, 1708).

have for the first time understood why they were true. After he had become a mystic, he was more convinced than ever of the necessity of the two great sacraments. Holy Baptism is the vehicle of regeneration to Gospel Christianity. The Eucharist is the means and instrument of that communion between God and man which is typified by Jacob's ladder.

All the controversy [about St John vi, 53-6] is at an end and has the most plain and satisfactory solution: such passages do not speak of the sacrament, because they speak of the *thing itself*, of which the sacrament is an appointed outward signification, but the sacrament *directly speaks* of and *points* to those passages, because they contain that *truth* and *reality* which the sacrament is appointed to signify. (v, 115.) Whatever names and titles this institution is signified to you by, whether it be called a *sacrifice*, propitiatory or commemorative; whether it be called an holy oblation, the eucharist, the *sacrament* of the *body* and *blood* of Christ, the sacrament of the *Lord's Supper*, the *heavenly banquet*, the food of immortality, or the *holy communion* and the like, matters not much. For all these words or names are right and good, and there is nothing wrong in them, but the striving and contention about them. For they all express *something* that is true of the sacrament . . . but all of them are far short of expressing the whole nature of the sacrament, and therefore the help of all of them is wanted. (v, 122, in *Demonstration of the Gross and Fundamental Errors of a Late Book called a Plain Account of the Nature and End of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper.*)

We rub our eyes. Can this really have been written in 1737, when in 1940 we are slowly working up to this position, greatly assisted by the book of the Swedish Bishop Brilioth, *Eucharistic Faith and Practice, Evangelical and Catholic* (translated by Fr Hebert, 1930)? Again, in relation to Holy Baptism, Law's—or rather Behmen's—extraordinary exegesis of Gen. iii, 15 is held alongside of his definite statement, "Jesus Christ came into the world declaring the necessity of a new birth to be sought by a Baptism into the name of Father, Son and Holy Ghost" (v, 64). His view of the ordinance is not altered by the fact that he also held this to be an *open* declaration of the *same* salvation that had been then only "typified and veiled under certain figures and shadows as He Himself had been"; no one held more emphatically than Law that the Eternal Son was the minister of creation (Heb. i, 2). Behmen himself defended infant baptism. I cannot myself make sense of Behmen's

Seven Natures or Mysterium Magnum, an explanation of Genesis, but if Law did, and was thereby only confirmed not shaken in his previous faith, what does it signify? Let us compare Law's Behmenism to the shell of a nut, which encloses the kernel that grows and sweetens as it partakes of the juices of the tree, while itself remaining hard and uneatable. Anyhow, as Overton says, Law would in any case have said that Behmenism was the *bene esse*, not the *esse*, of Christianity.

Here, then, is the great difference between Law and Tertullian. Montanism made Tertullian a schismatic and a bitter one, though he did write *De Corona Militis* after becoming a Montanist; but Law never left the Church of his baptism, while he became more and more liberal in his attitude to all parts of the divided Church of Christ. Thus (VI, 294):

> Take away all selfishness from the Papist and the Protestant or let them both be dead to the Workings of this Spirit, and then they will be as fully agreed about Gospel Truths, as they are in the form of a Square and a Circle.

Or (IX, 73):

> Suppose now a Preacher comes to you from Rome with his invented Doctrines about Saints, Images, Sacraments and Transubstantiation threatening damnation to all that do not receive them; suppose another coming from Geneva, as full of Damnation for all those who do not receive his invented doctrine of saving Faith without works; of the Righteousness of Christ not inwardly born but only outwardly imputed to you; of a Salvation and Damnation equally the one sole Work or Gift of God, neither of which you can any more help or hinder than you can help or hinder the Duration of the World or add one Cubit to your own Stature, what Gospel-Eyes must he have, who did not see as many Marks of the Beast, the whore and the false Prophet in one of these Preachers as in the other? Or can you think, if St Paul was again in the World, he would give a heartier God-speed to the one than to the other?

Hard blows certainly, but unquestionably the harder is aimed at the Calvinist. That partly explains the comparative failure of Law to impress his contemporaries. For, drained of the Non-jurors, the Church of England continued to have a strong Calvinistic impress till the Oxford Movement. The parsons read the Prayer Book collects and prayers, often without really understanding their meaning. For all that Law says of "images" above, he can say (IX, 309):

He whose fire is kindled from the divinity of Tully's rhetoric . . . may well be unable to bear the dullness of those who go on pilgrimages to visit the sepulchre, where the Redeemer of the World rose from the dead, or who grow devout at the sight of a crucifix, because the Son of God hung as a sacrifice thereon.

Law's *Letters to a Lady inclined to enter into the Communion of the Church of Rome* (posthumously published in 1779) contain the following:

Love the churches of Rome and Greece with the same affection and sense of Christian fellowship, as you love the Church of England, and consider yourself not as an external member of one in order to renounce communion with the other, but as necessarily forced into one externally divided part, because there is no part free from external division.

And yet in 1940 we have not cut out the second paragraph of Article XIX !

The really glorious passage is in the *Appeal* (VI, 273-280) of 1740:

"There is a Catholic Spirit, a Communion of Saints in the Love of God and all Goodness, which no one can learn from that which is called Orthodoxy in particular Churches, but is only to be had by a *total Dying* to all worldly views by a *pure Love* of God, and by such an *Unction* from above as delivers the Mind from all Selfishness, and makes it cover Truth and Goodness with an Equality of Affection in every Man, whether he be Christian, Jew or Gentile. . . . To get this spirit one must be convinced of three truths: (*a*) True orthodoxy can nowhere be found, but in a pure disinterested love of God and our Neighbour. (*b*) In the present divided state of the Church, Truth itself is torn and divided asunder and therefore he can be the only *true Catholic*, who has more of Truth, and less of Error, than is hedged in by any divided Part. (*c*) It is the Glory of the divine Justice to have no Respect of *Parties* or *Persons*. . . . He therefore that would like as God likes, and condemn as God condemns, must have neither the Eyes of the Papist nor the Protestant; he must like no Truth the less because *Ignatius Loyola* or *John Bunyan* was very zealous for it; nor have the less Aversion to any Error, because Dr Trap or George Fox had brought it forth." (Note the exquisite irony in the mention of Trap.) The eloquent peroration imagines a death-bed declaration, not of "strict attachment to the Church of England and of solemn Protestations against all other Churches," but a statement that such a person has chosen to live and die in outward Communion with the Church of England, "fully believing that if I worship God in *Spirit and in Truth* in this divided Part of the Church, I shall be as acceptable to him, as if I had been a

faithful Member of the one whole Church before it was broken into separate Parts. But as I am now going out of this disordered Division into a more *universal State* of Things; as I am now falling into the Hands of the great Creator and Lover of all *Souls*; as I am going to the God of *all Churches* to a Kingdom of *universal Love*, which must have its Inhabitants from all *People*, *Nations* and *Languages* of the Earth; so in this Spirit of universal Love, I desire to perform my last Act of Communion in this divided Church, uniting and joining in Heart and Spirit with all that is *Christian*, *Holy*, *Good and Acceptable* to God in all other Churches; praying from the Bottom of my Soul, that every Church may have *its Saints*, that God's Kingdom may come, His Will be done in every Division of Christians and Men, and that *every Thing that hath Breath may praise the Lord*."

In his last work, the proof sheets of which he did not live to correct, *A Humble, Earnest and Affectionate Address to the Clergy*, the three evils of the day, to which he most earnestly called their attention, were Mammonism, excessive requirement of oaths (the Non-juror took very literally Matt. v, 37), and the acquiescence in war (IX, 165-178) in which the destruction of young men—have we not experienced it?—seemed the most terrible feature. Law died in 1761, and so did not see the end of the Seven Years' War (1756-63), which some of us regard as the beginning of the untoward events that have led to the present war.

G. C. Richards.

Why are Christians Concerned in Politics?

We must observe that the question takes for granted that Christians are concerned in politics as Christians. It does not ask whether Christians should be or ought to be involved in politics. It assumes it and merely seeks to investigate the grounds on which such concern in politics rests. The question symbolizes how far we have travelled from the Chiliastic atmosphere of the New Testament. I am not sure that it does not symbolize also our distance from the New Testament itself. The lively hopes of the reappearance of the Lord entertained by apostolic Christians led them to a supreme disdain of politics. In the world of politics, New Testament Christians were foreigners. Their citizenship was in a far different world. To-day,

particularly after five hundred years of humanism, we have arrived at the extreme opposite of Chiliasm, and are much more conscious that we are citizens of this world than that we are citizens of another world. We have solved the Psalmist's problem of how to sing the Lord's song in a foreign land by the simple device of taking out naturalization papers. Christians, therefore, are naturally concerned in politics.

Well! If that is the assumption behind our question, the first thing to state, and to state emphatically, is that such a concern in politics is not a Christian concern. It may be anything you like—Liberal, Marxist, Conservative, Democratic. But not Christian. A Christian concern in politics must spring from a consciousness that this world is not the native heath of the redeemed soul. Only an interest dominated by that realization can possibly be Christian. *This is vital and fundamental.* And it involves a drastic, revolutionary re-orientation in contemporary Christian thinking about politics. We have to recover the Chiliast attitude to this world without abandoning our political interest in it. As in so much else, we have to achieve the tension of doing two opposite things at the same time.

Let us begin, then, by acknowledging that what passes to-day for Christian concern in politics is not Christian! It is conditioned, broadly, by two principles, neither of which is Christian: first, that it is possible by social action to create a Christian society, that it is possible to apply Christian principles (whatever that phrase may mean) to a non-Christian society; second, that it is part of the primary Christian mission to relieve suffering and to secure justice. Let me offer a few observations on each of these.

One of the fatal legacies which Modernism has left to our generation is the delusion that Christian ethics can be applied impersonally; that, by social action in the form of political legislation or economic organization, you can make society Christian, that you can implement Christian social values without Christian theology. We have now had at least three generations of a self-conscious "Social Gospel", of endeavours to christianize the social order by mass or majority or impersonal action. We have been trying to make society Christian without the initial revolution of the individual from the régime of egoistic will-to-power to that of utter submission to and dependence upon God. The answer is to be found in the second World

War, with which you can no more argue than with high-explosive bombs. The fact of Europe to-day sweeps away the complacent theorization of the Social Gospel. It is true that Christian agitation has resulted in the improvement of the material lot of the masses, *without, however, affecting the secularization of their minds and souls.* And I have yet to learn that an abundant consumption of commodities is in itself necessarily Christian. But even this problematic gain is now involved in the total destruction of war, which is the answer that history has given to a Church which has insufficiently appreciated that Christian behaviour is the fruit of repentance and submission to the Lord Jesus Christ. When Modernism transposed the Kingdom of God from heaven to this world, it opened the door to the seven devils of secularity. If religion is the opium of the masses, according to the Feuerbach thesis, much more is the Social Gospel the opium of Christians. The good which Christian social agitation has been able to achieve is finally trapped in the contradiction of man's radical sin, and in the event becomes the instrument of evil on a really gigantic scale. The whole of Europe is organized to-day to promote a definitely anti-Christian order of life. The nation in which Modernism achieved its greatest triumphs is the leader in the anti-Christian crusade. And the nation in which secularism ran a good second has revealed an appalling corruption and disintegration. Hence, if our concern in politics is inspired by the delusion that we can, by secular power, institute Christian principles into social structure and function, we are blindly heading for accumulating disaster. The Chiliastic abandonment of politics in the sects is ten thousand times preferable.

Christian political thinking has also been too much dominated by the idea that the relief of suffering is a primary Christian duty. It certainly is a Christian duty—but not a primary one. And a great deal depends on whether you put pity or sympathy in the first or the second place. Christian political thinking and practice have tended to put pity in the first place, where it has no business to be. The Churches have been disturbed—a little—by the lot of the poor and the unemployed, and have advocated and practised all sorts of measures, none of which have been fundamental. Christians have always been ready to pity the weak, so long as they did not challenge the bases of power. When the disinherited have attacked the founda-

tions of power, Christian pity has been rather overborne by less worthy sentiments.

Now this situation needs clarifying. If our first concern is the alleviation of suffering, then logically we should co-operate with the Nazis in the abolition of freedom; for freedom is the source of suffering. Nobody realized this so clearly as Dostoievsky. In his legend of the Grand Inquisitor, he describes the conflict between Catholicism and Christ on this very point. Catholicism is primarily concerned about human suffering and so would keep man in leading strings. Christ is more concerned about freedom, through which alone man can find salvation, and must therefore suffer.

Our first concern is repentance. How to get men to repent? If our primary interest is to abolish human suffering, we are on the road to Fascism, with which Rome is willing to flirt. Rome will bless a Franco or even a Hitler, so long as he leaves the Church alone. She will wink at dictatorship so long as it confines itself to the secular sphere because she does not want men to suffer. But the fact of freedom is proof that God is concerned about something greater than suffering. Satan is the philanthropist. But it is God who is the Redeemer.

How we can relieve human suffering is not, therefore, the formative, determining principle of Christian political thinking, but how we can bring men to repentance, so that they may appropriate the gift of God in Christ. In the endeavour to apply that principle, it is inevitable that we shall relieve a great deal of suffering. But in that case, relief of suffering will be a consequence, not a primary. And that will make all the difference in the world. For example, permanently underfed men do not make probable subjects of repentance. Malnutrition is an obstacle to conviction of sin. Pity for suffering must be subordinated to passion for souls.

So we are not, as Christians, concerned in politics for the reason that political action can create a Christian society. It for ever cannot. Only God can make society Christian. Neither are we concerned in politics for the sake of material amelioration and the relief of suffering. That way lies soppy, bourgeois sentimentalism. Christian concern in politics springs from the fundamental theological, biblical view of God and man.

* * * * *

Why, then, should Christians be concerned in politics? As Christians? I am more than suspicious of the dichotomy which divides the Christian into two entities, one of which functions in the Church and the other in the State. Whilst these two spheres are objectively real, the spirit and principle determining Christian action is the same for both. There surely must be a clear-cut distinction between Christian action in politics and mere secular, humanist, non-Christian action, even when the acts and politics of both are superficially the same.

The answer to this question depends ultimately upon theology, so for the moment let me turn from political theory to theology.

The basic fact is that this world, history, is not God's world, but man's. History is the arena of moral freedom in which man is endeavouring to exist successfully in independence from God. It is, in other words, an experiment in the impossible. The theme, the motif, of history is human will-to-power. It is the working out of the delusion of human sovereignty. This is what the Bible means by Original Sin and the Fall of Man. History is the prolonged attempt, in different and successive forms, to demonstrate that man can be his own master, that he can make a success of existence in his own right, and apart from God. It is an effort to treat with God as an equal or as an inferior—mostly as an inferior. The forms in which this effort embodies itself are different social systems and civilizations. There is only one thing that they all have in common, from primitive tribalism to Western capitalism—namely, *their self-destructiveness*. The more developed, the more progressive the civilization, the more self-destructive it becomes. As the potentiality for good gets greater, the greater is the actuality for evil; since the good is finally made subordinate to the evil. Just contrast the bows and arrows of the Normans with the dive bombers of the Germans; or Napoleon's Fouché and secret police with Himmler and the Gestapo.

All this is the process in which man is exhausting his self-determination, his capacity for independence. It is man's world. It is human freedom in conflict with God, which God does not suppress, which He tolerates. God does not put a stop to it. He allows it to continue. When one civilization breaks down, God does not forbid the rise of another. In fact He encourages it. The succession of

civilizations is a process of *reductio ad absurdum*. Each failure narrows down the field of possibilities. For instance, the world will not return to Feudalism. The attempt to organize society within a framework of paternal land-ownership finally collapsed in 1789. What the *ancien régime* failed to do then, the resurrected corpses of French capitalism will not succeed in doing in 1940. The world never goes back on its tracks. *It never returns to an exhausted civilization.* That is a cast-iron law of historic development.

Now the answer of God to this historic process is the Incarnation, which is the only non-historic event in history. That is a contradiction, I know, but it is a fact. In Christ, God created a new humanity, whose objective is to re-orientate men (not MAN) into a new relation of submission to God. Christianity, therefore, seeks to win persons to a freely-willed subordination to God. It has nothing to do with building new civilizations and social orders and all the other claptrap so dear to the liberal social gospel, *except negatively*. Civilization is impersonal, institutional, coercive and mechanical. That is the objective of human will-to-sovereignty. A new civilization—socialism, for instance—will also be coercive. Let us not make any mistake about that. Christ did not die in order to establish a superior form of coercion. He died to redeem men into a new relationship of free slavery to God. And men must will that relationship themselves. Christianity is the withering away of civilization. The Kingdom of God is the anarchy of reciprocal ecstasy, where everybody does as he likes and what everybody likes is mutually beneficial and desirable. It is the one and only Utopia that is not Utopian.

How, then, can the new humanity already in the world, though not of it, win the old humanity? Only by convincing persons that the game is all up, that successful existence apart from God is impossible. That is what the New Testament calls repentance. Blessed are they who repent before the Last Judgment. Blessed are they who can be persuaded of that without waiting for the further proof of failure. But we must be realist. The millions will not repent without further proof. They will have to experience new civilizations and greater disaster before they finally realize that their redemption lies in the acceptance of Christ. And since God is the one and only dictator

who jealously safeguards freedom, man will have to go through with his new civilizations, his Socialism, his Co-operative Commonwealths, his Communism, his Fascism and what not, in order to learn at last that there cannot be two Kings. Only one, and that one God.

Thus politics is a long-distance process of deferred repentance. And that is why *Christians*—Christians, not Socialists or Humanists—should be concerned in politics. To fashion a new social order means politics. A new social order is an element in the repentance of the human race. So Christians must co-operate with unregenerate man in trying the new experiment, which, though foredoomed to failure, will, nevertheless, bring man nearer to repentance.

The purpose of civilization is not to give to every man three acres and a cow, but by giving him three acres and a cow to convince him, by failure, that he must depend on God. Man thinks that three acres and a cow will do the trick. By all means, therefore, let him have his three acres and cow. But that means politics.

Mr Arnold Toynbee has realized this truth, in a different form, in his Burge Memorial Lecture.[1] After surveying the rise and fall of civilizations in the past, he goes on: " If there is anything in this analysis of the relation between civilizations and higher religions this suggests a third possible view of that relation which would be the exact inverse of the second view which I have put before you. On that second view, religion is subsidiary to the reproduction of secular civilizations on earth " (pp. 19 f. and 22). Civilizations become instruments of Providence to bring men and women to repentance. Politics is thus invested with the profoundest significance, the neglect of which is fatal to Christianity. Christians are thus concerned with the politics of this world so as to enable men to possess another world.

Since politics, then, is the historic mechanism which God uses to deflate the human will-to-sovereignty, to deprive man of his delusion of omnipotence, Christians must concern themselves with it. Here is the ground of Christian activity in politics. The non-Christian may strive to secure justice for its own sake. But not the Christian. As an end in itself, the Christian has no interest in justice, which is

[1] *Christianity and Civilization* (S.C.M. Press, 1s.).

merely the equilibrium of conflicting wills-to-power. From the point of view of the Kingdom of God, there is no spiritual difference between the rule of the capitalist class and that of the proletariat. *But there is an historic difference*—and that is vastly important. It is this: that whilst the rule of the capitalist no longer provides a basis for man's belief in his own omnipotence, the rule of the working class, because it has not yet been tried, does. Society can no longer function within capitalism. Even Christians are beginning to realize that. Ah! But it will function finally within socialism. Lots of Christians believe that, too. It's an illusion, of course, but an illusion of value to the Kingdom of God, because it will close one more avenue (now lying open) of human escape from God. Therefore, let's have socialism, which is the political measles of the adolescence of history. Man must go through with it. But socialism involves political struggle.

And this defines the line of the Christian attitude to politics. It is support of the untried illusion as against the exhausted, deflated reality. In other words, it is the agitation for what the liberal calls "progress" and the Marxist calls "the next step in historic development" as against what the Tory calls "law and order", which is a rationalization of class egoism. That untried next step is one of the unstormed defences against God. The Tory's "law and order" is already a broken barricade. So be progressive so as to push man a step nearer the final alternative of accepting God or going to hell, of repenting or perishing.

How can a Tory or a reactionary possibly be Christian? I suppose that with God all things are possible. But there can be no doubt that a Christian Tory is certainly impeding God's historic strategy, because he is defending what history has already exhausted. And history is God's judgment on social systems. With the final breakdown of capitalism, God is saying "Guilty". And Christians who defend it are really saying to God—"No! You are wrong. Capitalism is innocent!" Hitler is the price Europe is paying for the historic blindness of good, pious Christians, like Marshal Pétain, and the Pope of Rome and Pastor Niemöller, who in 1933 welcomed Hitler as the defender of capitalism. And in the Divine Providence, Hitler is being driven to destroy even capitalism. God has a very grim sense of humour.

It is the lack of historic, political realism in Christians in general and theologians in particular which accounts for your Marx, your Lenins and Trotskys, etc. Providence must get on with the job. God cannot wait for ever. If Christians, who are personal saints, persist in being political nitwits, then that part of the job is given over to rougher hands, with the result that humanity pays through the nose, as the saying goes. History would be less bloody if revolution was in the hands of humble penitents.

So the conclusion is simple: let Christians be progressive in politics, without sharing the illusions of the progressives. Our Lord formulated the principle long ago when He said: "Be ye wise as serpents, but innocent as doves."

D. R. Davies.

Man in Contemporary Literature

A Study in the Writings of Duhamel and Mauriac.

"Once man did eat angels' food, after which he now hungereth."—St Anselm.

The novelists of any age constitute by their writings a curious mirror into which, when a man peers, he sees not so much the reflection of his own countenance or the features of his day, as portraits *à thèse*. For it is evident from their lopsided conceptions of man, that most of the moderns have axes to grind. Characters are created endowed only with senses or else they are mere vehicles of desiccated pseudo-intellectualism. Their business is to forward by their existence some philosophy of living. Too seldom does one chance across a full-length portrait of man as he is, body, brain and soul. Genuine objectivity as a literary quality would appear to be on the wane. The novel is becoming a credal statement rather than a reflection of life in its fulness of spirit as well as body.

Certain of our contemporaries have created an artificial world where neither vice nor virtue has any meaning whatever and where human beings move outside of any moral context.

Aldous Huxley[1] and the late Marcel Proust are the Veronicas of this world of despairing nihilism, for their work is the *vera icon* of this nightmare void where nothing matters.

[1] *E.g.*, *Point Counter Point*, but to this oppose *Ends and Means*.

For Proust men and women are botanical specimens, completely amoral entities. Indeed, he time and again likens them to lilacs and roses and appears oblivious of the terrible meaningless world he is creating.

On the other hand, if the writer does not participate in the peopling of this void with shadows, he presents us with an imperfect, incomplete creature. Either the body governs all or the mind holds sway. D. H. Lawrence affords us examples of the former and Gide's Alissa is imprisoned in the cell which is her own mind. But it is unnecessary to cite examples,[1] for one is forced to notice that creations of the majority of contemporary writers are unbalanced, weighted down on one side or the other.

The statement made by a retired colonel (turned critic for the nonce), that most of the people he encountered in modern novels needed a dose of salts, is not without an element of salutary truth. For we need more studies of human normality, where the spiritual aspirations and the intellectual and physical appetites of ordinary beings are contemplated and investigated in their entirety, studies in which St Francis is not regarded as a lunatic and Rabelais' *Fay ce que vouldras* is not considered the only "natural" rule of life.

Our novelists ignore the fact that the longing for God, the practice of a moral life, are just as much elements of the human constitution as are the various bodily desires and the absorbing interests of the intellect.

It is not, therefore, because they conform more or less to a prearranged conception of man, but because of their eminent saneness in the observation of the *whole* being of man, that Georges Duhamel and François Mauriac are worthy of no little attention. Each, after his several fashion, desires only to investigate man, his grandeur and his misery, taking cognizance of all the facts. And in their treatment of the subject, from almost opposite view points, Duhamel and Mauriac exercise that knightly virtue of *la mesure* so gracefully commended in one of the lays of Marie de France. If Duhamel is deficient in his sense of God, his sensitivity will not permit him to impugn the religious experience of a Jammes or a Claudel. Man, for him, has spiritual longings and is a moral being. Duhamel has said that for him Christianity has *toutes les beautés*, and, indeed,

[1] *E.g.*, T. F. Powys' and Galsworthy's conception of man, THEOLOGY, Vol. XI, No. 240, "Morals and the Modern Novel."

the ethics of the Gospel are his. But he has not glimpsed the glory of God as yet. One remembers St Thomas's image of the bat blinded by the sun. The sun is nevertheless there.

The splendour and the error of his beliefs are all contained in a phrase from the *Journal de Salavin*: " A mon avis, ce n'est pas spécialement la ferveur religieuse qui fait le saint, c'est . . . l'ordonnance de la vie morale." For him it is the internal disposition of the soul which ranks first. He recoils from Christian dogma. " Toute doctrine sent le sépulcre."

Though, for the Christian, any estimate of man which excludes God is, of course, hopelessly deficient, Duhamel does not belong to those whose estimate of man excludes also one-half of his being. Duhamel's " man " is not maimed so much as lonely and seeking.

Mauriac, on the other hand, will not force his characters to act as puppets illustrating Catholic doctrine. Catholicism and sensuality form a continual background of tension in his novels against which the characters in their fulness of rational beings, possessed of a body and a soul, are thrown into vivid relief. There is no propaganda, but the plain fact of the impact of Christian morality upon the life of ordinary humans is recognized in all his work.

Jean Ehrhard's comment is penetrating: " Le plus vif attrait de Mauriac, c'est qu'il a su relever le goût désormais banal de la chair en considérant la luxure du point de vue chrétien, en l'éclairant des reflets de la doctrine catholique."[1]

Both Mauriac and Duhamel excel in the portrayal of the ordinary middle-class *milieu* in which so much drama is played out. But while Mauriac delights in the tiny drama of provincial towns, Duhamel has made his great contribution not alone by his picture of life in its normal course of events, but also by his picture of man confronted with the vast upheaval of 1914-18.[2]

If ever a Christian school of literary criticism comes into being, the touchstone for its judgment on contemporary writing must be the notion of man found therein. Questions of style and treatment are the same for all judges, but a Christian critic has a primary duty, for he believes with Berdyaev that " man without God is no longer man."[3]

[1] *Le Roman Français, depuis Marcel Proust*, J. Ehrhard, p. 175.
[2] V. *Civilisation* and *Vie des Martyrs*.
[3] *The End of Our Time*, pp. 54, 55.

Literature can continue to hold nothing but a distorting mirror up to life as long as it persists for the large part in ignoring the spiritual side of man's existence and the rich unity of his being. This is, then, the supreme reason for the rejection as imperfect of the pitiable and maimed creatures, puppets of the senses and of theorizings, that are so frequently served up in our time as the veritable portrait of man.

There is wisdom in Wilde's sonnet, " Hélas !" He, too, found that emphasis laid upon one side of his being at the expense of the rest did but " mar the secret of the whole ".

The antidote to all this loose thinking and daubed portraiture is the spirit which impelled St Augustine to write, " I could not be at all wert Thou not in me."[1]

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" Malgré toutes ses saletés, toutes ses misères, toutes ses folies, l'humanité est quelque chose de grand, dont il ne faut pas désespérer."[2] The religion of Georges Duhamel can be summed up in a single word, Man. But in this religion he is free from that barbarous " rationalism " which tries to solve questions of sensibility by means of the intelligence. All that the nineteenth-century belief in automatic progress of the race stands for is foreign to his humanism. Despite his training as a doctor and a scientist he would solve the problem of human unhappiness by the power of the heart. Man's need is *moral* civilization. His hopes are centred in man rather than in the race. Almost his entire evangel is contained in this extract from *La Possession du Monde*: " La guerre a démontré que la civilisation scientifique et industrielle, fondée sur l'intelligence, est condamnée. Son règne aboutit à un immense échec. C'est vers les ressources du cœur que se tourne notre esprit. La civilisation scientifique doit être une servante, non une déesse. Substituons-lui la civilisation morale, le règne du cœur, seule capable de sauver la race humaine."

The series of poignant war sketches entitled *Civilisation* is a heart-breaking commentary on these lines. In that book Duhamel's abundant love of mankind is in every page. The invalid soldier, a simple soul, whose pride was in the fact that his father wore a collar, the wounded poilu who died, not as a result of his serious injuries, but because

[1] *Confessions*, Bk. I, sect. II. [2] Duhamel, *Les Hommes Abandonnés*, p. 116.

of a disfiguring pimple on his nose—all the brave and simple and sordid human creatures with all their aspirations are beloved individuals. Duhamel performed over fifteen hundred operations during the Great War. It can only be his love of humanity which kept him going under the strain.

It is the " reign of the heart " which must succeed. He has proved by his own experience that this is the key.

Is there a great gulf between such a man and Blaise Pascal, who has said: " Le Dieu des chrétiens est un Dieu d'amour et de consolation; c'est un Dieu qui remplit l'âme et le cœur de ceux qu'il possède"? He who loves his neighbour must not be far from loving God. For the Christian this is the inexplicable halt in Duhamel's belief. How is it, to invert St Anselm's phrase, that aiming at man he has not stumbled upon God ?

Duhamel's heart is filled with love of man. A great traveller, his voyagings bring him more and more into contact with men and women, so that his work reflects his vast comprehension. Somewhere or other it is recorded of Robespierre that he has declared, " L'homme ne voit jamais l'homme sans plaisir," and this is certainly true of Duhamel. Totally different from Proust, he studies man not as a phenomenon but as a living brother who invents, prays, eats, makes love and is capable of equally astonishing nobility and sordidness.

It is this central theme of man which gives to all his work—novels, sketches and poems—a unity and direction.

Read about the dying Revaud.[1] Read, if you can without a catch in the throat, *La mort de Mercier*.[2] Smile at the priest and the rabbi facing each other over a grave.[3] Marvel at this diverse pageant of man which is the work of Georges Duhamel and wonder at one who accepts the Maundy Thursday commandment and yet who can only glimpse the hem of Christ's garment amongst that very crowd which throngs the pages of his own books. Think generously of one who envied a friend's power to pray.

In all his work, the Salavin books, the Pasquier *Chronicles*, in his war sketches and his poetry, Duhamel's style aims at a natural and unadorned clarity of expression. At the same time, he avoids the pitfall of angularity. His style is never stiff. With this he combines great subtlety of observation and description.

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[1] *Civilisation.* [2] *Vie des Martyrs.* [3] *Civilisation.*

His views on the novel are part of his views on humanity, for he has placed on record his contempt for the writer who will invent characters to illustrate his theories.

Duhamel is one of the few contemporaries who attain genuine objectivity in his representation of man in the twentieth century.

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The work of Mauriac has been compared in more than one quarter to that of Racine. There is the same struggle between the flesh and the spirit, sensuality and spirituality. An adept psychologist, the upheavals in the souls of the majority of his characters are reduced, after examination, to this primary antagonism.

Mauriac's work has provincial life for its setting. He believes that this is the *milieu* where drama, the essential drama of flesh and spirit, is played out. The narrow puritanism and strong family influence of the provinces are the contributory factors in this strife which is the theme of his work. A provincial himself, he knows his subject well.

He believes that there is a kind of fatality in the desires of the flesh which can be restrained only by grace. " Il n'y a que la grâce pour surmonter quelquefois la nature."

The portrayal of the victory over the flesh contained in *Le Fleure de Feu* and *Le Baiser au Lépreux* is vivid and convincing.

Again like Racine, the movement and development of Mauriac's work are not in incidents but in the souls and minds of the characters. This is particularly noticeable in *Le Désert de l'Amour*, where a slight received by Raymond Courrèges as an adolescent forms the mainspring of the entire novel. Mauriac's genius as an artist lies in his complete success with this kind of method, which in his hands never becomes prosy and is always sustained. His style, unlike Duhamel's, is not ascetic.

The novel *Destins* shows Mauriac developing his usual theme but also handling with skill the subsidiary one of the interaction upon each other of human personalities. No man, in these pages, lives to himself alone.

Mauriac's contribution to the study of man in present-day literature lies largely in certain facts. First of all, he takes a practical view of man. His attitude is not that of a reproving ecclesiastic, but he has a strong consciousness of sin. Nor is his view of sin a moralistic one. He views

it, to cite Aulén, as "a state of alienation from God". The characters in *Ce qui était perdu* exist in a miserable world, alienated from God because of their lack of the sense of sin rather than because of individual sins. *Ce qui était perdu* is a Christian's impression of that meaningless world referred to earlier in this article.

Again, his importance consists in his investigation of human passions from a Catholic view-point. He never confuses people as they are with what they should be. This way his work is vivid, natural and absorbing. The reader never registers the impression that he is being preached at. He is presented with a section of human life in which the facts of desire and of the corrective influence of Christianity come into play with a completely convincing result. Mauriac is an excellent psychologist, and just for that reason he presents us with characters we would describe as ordinary people, knowing as we do that beneath the crust of normality are the whirlpools and eddies which form the essence of all drama.

Finally, Mauriac stands in clear-cut distinction from those of his contemporaries who set up a false system of values. His valuation of man is the valuation of the Church. It is the valuation of Him who "knew what was in man". And in his work one can discern something of the gentleness of Him who forgave the adulteress and condemned the sins of the spirit[1] more sternly than he reproved the sins of the flesh.

Nevertheless there is no compromise in Mauriac's attitude. He knows sin and he knows holiness. That is his value in the literature of today, where so many lines of demarcation have become blurred.

H. R. McAdoo.

The Church in Württemberg, 1938-9

The following is a memorandum of my experiences during the period October, 1938, to July, 1939, when I was staying as an exchange guest at the Evangelisches Stift, Tübingen, Württemberg. It does not, of course, claim to be an exhaustive account of the situation during the period

[1] *Cf. Le Nœud des Vipères*, where Mauriac portrays the poisoned soul in sombre colours.

immediately prior to the outbreak of war; it deals only, in the main, with matters whereof I have myself either been a witness or on which I obtained first-hand information. The account is dependent almost entirely on personal recollection, as I kept no diary during my stay in Germany. Consequently I cannot *guarantee* the accuracy of anything that I have written, but I have made every endeavour to present a true picture, both in general impression and in concrete detail.

THE CHURCH IN WÜRTTEMBERG: ITS HISTORICAL ASPECT: CHURCH AND PEOPLE

The Protestant Church in Württemberg is Lutheran in confession, but in externals closer to the Calvinist tradition.[1] Thus the preaching service is the central feature of public worship, and it is non-liturgical in character. The Lord's Supper is administered only on feasts and other solemn days, and in some places once a month. The form of celebration is Calvinist in character, and probably, despite the confession, the Calvinist doctrine of the Eucharist is that generally held.

Another important fact in the history of the Church is the movement of *Pietism*. Even to-day this is a strong force in rural areas. The Pietists are not schismatics: they worship with the Church; they hold their *Bibelstunden* unofficially, though generally with the approval of the parish minister, and not infrequently with his active sympathy and support.

The Swabish have always been a very pious folk, and this is true even to-day. Sunday morning congregations, both Catholic and Protestant, wherever I went were encouragingly large, and even the young people, upon whose time the Party makes increasing calls, were generally well represented. There is no doubt that the Church enjoys the support and sympathy of the large bulk of popular opinion, even among non-churchgoers. This fact was constantly repeated to me even by such theological teachers as were least disposed to seek the support of public opinion, and regarded with manifest distrust any overtures made by the "world" towards the Church.

[1] Throughout, the use of "Evangelical", when applied to German Churches, means "Lutheran" and not "pietistic" in the English sense.

The Church ranks officially to-day as a "Confessing" Church, a position which it shares with the Churches of Hanover, Bavaria and Baden. But this does not mean that every member holds the green card of the Confessional Church. Only two of the seven *Repetenten* (the teaching body of the Stift) were members of this group. Most, for instance, were not wholeheartedly sympathetic with Pastor Niemöller—they thought he was himself partly to blame for his fate by his own indiscretions.

THE CHURCH IN THE UNIVERSITY

It was with the Church in the university that I came into more immediate contact. This means—(1) the Stift, (2) the Theological Faculty, (3) the Studentenpfarrer.

(1) THE STIFT

A brief description of the Stift's nature and function must be given. In the past it has given to the world Kepler, Hegel, Schelling, David Strauss, and Ferdinand Christian Bauer. To-day it exists to give four years' theological training in preparation for the ministry of the Church of Württemberg.[1] It is open only to Swabish-born students, and a high intellectual standard is necessary to gain admission. The cost of training, including board and lodging, is entirely free. It was met until recently (1918) by the State of Württemberg—the college was founded originally in 1504 by Duke Eberhard to train men for service in Church and State; and although it now performs only the first half of its original function it is still dependent for its funds entirely on the State, now of course the Reich, which has succeeded the old Württemberg State.

The institution is governed by an Ephorus, Professor Karl Fezer being the present holder of that office.

The number of theological students in the Stift had fallen from 120 to 80 since 1933. In proportion to the fall in numbers at other universities—*e.g.*, Marburg—this is surprisingly small. The drop is attributed (1) to compulsory military training—would-be students of theology

[1] What follows applies of course only up to July, 1939. I have no information subsequent to the outbreak of war. Many of the students and one of the Repetents were to serve in the army in August. Probably nearly all have been called up and the Stift almost certainly closed. I believe the University closed too—one student of English from whom I had a letter after war began had migrated to Munich.

drift into other callings when they come out of the army, (2) to the unpromising prospect of the ministry as a career—only men of real conviction have the courage to enter the ministry to-day. It is generally agreed that the standard of men who offer themselves for ordination is to-day definitely higher than that of a few years ago, both intellectually and spiritually.

The Students and Theology

The students receive four years' thorough training in theology. They attend both the university lectures and the lectures of the Repetents in the Stift. They do courses in Old and New Testaments (in Hebrew and Greek), Dogmatics, Systematics, Church History, Philosophy, Liturgy, Ethics, Pastoral Theology. They receive thorough training in the writing and delivering of exegetical sermons, and in the teaching of the young in schools. Both the latter include practice as well as theory. In fact the ground covered and the thoroughness with which it is covered are simply amazing. It is claimed that only thus can they turn out men who really understand the gospel which they are to preach in face of the hostility of the modern world.

The teaching may seem over-intellectual. But the two years which the men have had in the army before they begin their studies to-day is a potent corrective to excessive academicalism. But on the side of worship and devotion their training is lamentably weak. At present there is no chapel in the Stift—the library was in process of conversion into a chapel when I left; this is the result of fruitful contact with English theological colleges—Westcott House and Queen's College, Birmingham. The only corporate worship was short morning prayers before breakfast in the Hall, and a sermon delivered by a Repetent every Sunday evening. In other respects too they were deficient in corporate life—there was, for instance, no common room, and the older student corporations are a thing of the past. But many of the students preserved a healthy contact with students of other faculties, many of them friendships which originated in the army.

The Students and the Party

Those whose intelligence and sincerity I most respected and who were about my own age (24) had been enthusiastic Nazis in their later school days—*i.e.*, from about 1931-34.

They thought that National Socialism was the salvation of the old spiritual values of German civilization in face of the inrush of post-war Bolshevism and materialism. But after the *Machtübernahme* of 1933 they grew increasingly suspicious of the Party. Two years in the army have done nothing to allay their suspicions, and they will confess to-day that the Party has gone " Bolshevik ", that the extremists have got the upper hand over the idealists. They even talk of the State in apocalyptic terms as Antichrist. A few of these will even express regret at the foreign policy of expansion—they will regret the breaking of the pledged word; but these are few, and the majority acquiesce, and say that foreign politics is a dirty business anyway, and that all governments equally are controlled by purely selfish motives. Slightly younger students, however, who came to political consciousness in or after 1933, and had no time to develop scepticism before they went into the army, retain their idealism and declare that, save on the question of Church policy, they are in wholehearted agreement as Christians and Germans with the Party. They think that the Church cannot stand aloof from the reconstruction of national life, while the older group would be more in sympathy with the Confessional Church. But I noticed that some of the younger group also developed a scepticism during the course of the year, especially when the war clouds began to gather from Whitsun onwards. In June a *Studententagung* was held in the university, at which the students were treated to a speech from a Gauleiter extolling the students of 1914 for the idealism and enthusiasm with which they laid down their lives for the Vaterland at Langemarck, and exhorting the N.S. students of today to be ready to do likewise. A friend of mine, who was of my own age, said that there would be no idealism on the battlefield today—he loved soldiering in peace-time but knew enough of it to be sure that the real thing was horribly grim—he was resigned and fatalistic.

(2) THE THEOLOGICAL FACULTY

There are two theological faculties at Tübingen, the Roman Catholic and Evangelical. They work quite harmoniously side by side and in growing contact with each other.

The Party has gradually won a hold over nearly all the faculties of the university—insufficiently political professors

have been removed elsewhere and wholehearted National Socialists appointed in their place. Only here and there are there professors who represent the older order of things —in the Arts side mostly. But so far the theological faculties have not at Tübingen been affected by this Nazification; they remain to-day the last significant stronghold of academic freedom as well as being still staffed by professors and teachers who are Christians and loyal to the Gospel and Church before all else. Nothing has happened here like at Jena. There was considerable apprehension when Professor Heim retired, but to the surprise and joy of everyone Professor Köberle was called from Basle to succeed Heim. But there are indications of the way in which the wind is blowing. The Roman Catholic faculty in Munich was closed in early spring on a quite inadequate pretext, and at an open meeting in Tübingen at which the Württemberg Minister of Education was present the Rector of the university (*i.e.*, vice-chancellor) openly stated that in a National Socialist university there was no room for a Christian theological faculty. This utterance was generally regarded as being a private expression of opinion, and no indication of immediate policy. Indeed it would be very inadvisable to close down the theological faculties at Tübingen. Out of over 1,000 students, 530 of them in one year (1937-38) were theologians, 150 Roman Catholic and 380 Evangelical. It is principally theology to-day which attracts students to Tübingen from other parts of the Reich, from Switzerland, from England and America. Then the abolition of the faculties would involve serious financial loss to the university.

What impressed me most about the position of the theological faculty in the university was the respect it enjoyed from members of other faculties—including the teaching staff where the latter was not subservient to the Party. Professor Fezer's lectures on pastoral theology were attended by a lady who is a teacher in the Faculty of Psychology—there were quite a number of medicos present when he was talking about marriage and divorce, venereal disease and kindred subjects. Heim's lectures on Christian Social Ethics attracted a large number of students from other faculties, including especially historians and jurists, while his course on Christianity and Natural Science was attended by Professor Friedrich von Huene, an archæologist and palæontologist, who co-operated with him in providing

charts for the illustration of biological evolution; this course attracted students, men and women, from all faculties, especially the medicos, for twenty-five of whom Heim altered the time of his lectures to enable them to attend.

THEOLOGY AT TÜBINGEN

It is obviously impossible to enter into a full discussion of the foremost interests of Tübingen theology; the general theological atmosphere can be indicated only in outline.

Tübingen, of course, like all other universities, had had its liberal period, but from the end of the last century, until his death in 1939, Professor Adolf Schlatter, a man of Swiss and Calvinist origin, while an antidogmatist, was a thoroughgoing biblicist. In the early part of his life he stood out as a solitary figure in resistance to the prevailing theological attitude. But he gradually came into his own, and has influenced Kittel and Fezer considerably. Hence, while it has generally been receptive to Barth's message, Tübingen theology occupies a mediating position between thoroughgoing liberalism and the extreme reaction against it. This is seen in its attitude to natural theology and the problems of Christian anthropology. Under the combined impact of Karl Barth and the revived biblicism on the one hand and the effects of the Church conflict on the other, theological study is an intensely serious striving with the Word of God. The old pre-war flippancy of the historico-critical school is now a thing of the past. At Tübingen the times are too urgent for that. Theology is not just the playful exercise of the critical intellect, but a discipline to enable the preacher more effectively and intelligently to proclaim the Gospel of God in a desperate situation. Professor Kittel's standpoint in this connection is interesting. He claims to be still an historical critic engaged in purely *wissenschaftlich* study of the New Testament, but he shows that the results of earlier study were in fact a cavalier rejection and a misrepresentation of evidence in the interests of the particular theories of the critics. In fact what claimed to be objective criticism was mostly highly subjective. The task of the New Testament critic, as Professor Kittel sees it, is to live within the life of the Church; which, while it will indeed lead him to accept evidence on grounds which would appear inadequate to the secular historian, has its compensation in that the critic starts with a sympathy towards

his documents which is the essential prerequisite of their understanding. There is thus less danger of imposing one's own meaning on the documents and a readier disposition to let them speak for themselves. It is significant that Professor Kittel argued strongly for the historicity of the bodily resurrection of Jesus and the empty tomb, and treated seriously in another course of lectures the author of the Fourth Gospel's claim to be an eyewitness of Jesus Christ—though from saying that to identifying him with John the son of Zebedee is a further step than critical certainty will yet warrant. Generally his attitude and position are similar to that of Professor Dodd at Cambridge, but he distrusts the latter's emphasis on the importance of the Hellenistic element in the New Testament. Even the author of the Fourth Gospel is Jewish in outlook, and, although it is the language of Hellenistic religion and philosophy that he uses, it is always with meanings controlled by the Old Testament, the Rabbis, and the primitive Gospel. Professor Kittel is also a zealous student of the *Umwelt* of the New Testament—the study especially of Hellenistic religions and philosophies, and he claims that the importance of such study lies not in the adducing of parallels to the New Testament but in their throwing the *uniqueness* of the New Testament message into sharp relief.

There is also a growing Catholicity of outlook which was particularly discernible in Professor Köberle's teaching. The complete insularity of Lutheranism in time and space—the idea that Church history began in 33 and lasted till about 100 and died until 1517 and is henceforth restricted to German soil—is definitely breaking down. Professor Köberle in his lectures in *Dogmatik I* dealt not only with the differences between the Calvinistic and Lutheran communions but gave a very sympathetic account of the Eastern Church, and was even quite sympathetic towards the Church of Rome.[1] Side by side with the rediscovery of the genuine Luther (as distinct from Lutheranism) this growing Catholicity of outlook gives one of the most encouraging hopes for reunion. It has its roots in the rediscovery of the New Testament idea of the Church.

R. H. Fuller.

(*To be concluded.*)

[1] I was disappointed that he did not deal with the Church of England.

National Days of Prayer

Since war started we have had three National Days of Prayer: the first, on October 1, 1939, can in no true sense be said to have been "nationally" observed, and it is said that the publishers of the Special Form of Prayer issued by authority and bearing the imprint of the Royal Arms had large stocks left on their hands. The other observances, on May 26 and September 8, heralded by wide publication of the "King's desire", appear to have been better kept, though I know one parish church where the ordinary attendance was only slightly increased in spite of a special invitation card sent to every house. One cannot help feeling that the main reason for this far from universal observance is the choice of a Sunday rather than a week-day, and that something far more drastic is needed to awaken a nation which has largely lost the habit of Sunday worship than the giving of a special character to the normal Sunday services. The man who never goes to church on Sunday—and anyone who has seen football crowds on a Saturday afternoon and compared them with the thin sprinkling of men in any church congregation knows that the number of such men is legion—shrinks from breaking a habit of years and facing the Sunday congregation; but let a special weekday be set apart and, say, at least the forenoon be proclaimed a Bank Holiday, during the hours of which all ordinary business is ordered by Royal Command to be suspended for the one and only purpose of supplicating the Almighty in His house, surely the most obstinate avoider of public worship would be compelled to *think* even if he did not join in prayer. But that is not all. A man's body must be touched as well as his mind; bodily mortification should find its place in such an emergency as calls for a day of special prayer, and bodily abstinence cannot be associated with the weekly feast of the Resurrection. Prayer in any serious national crisis or for other urgent cause has always, in both the Jewish and Christian Churches, been linked with physical fasting, of which many Biblical instances can be cited, notably the story of Nineveh in the Old Testament; and in the New Testament it was when they "ministered unto the Lord and fasted" that the Holy Ghost said, "Separate me Barnabas and Saul . . . and when they had fasted and prayed" their consecration took

place. The English Reformers abolished many ancient practices but emphatically retained " Days of Fasting and Abstinence " set out in a definite table printed in every Prayer Book, but Sundays were carefully excluded from the forty days of Lent, though many muddle-headed clergy insist on Sunday use of the Ash Wednesday collect, which is not so ordered. Far from abrogating fasting the Tudor Governments, not always perhaps from the purest motives, rigorously enforced the practice of it and even threatened butchers with imprisonment, fine or pillory for killing meat on fast days ; while the Church of those days defined fasting as " Standing in forbearing flesh and eating but one meal a day ".[1] In the eighteenth century, although evangelicals inconsistently ignored the Church's fasts while discountenancing theatres and dancing as worldly, public fasts by order of Parliament or of the King in Council were not infrequent. In 1759, when France was overrunning North America and threatening British possessions elsewhere, and when " a despondency without parallel in our history took possession of our coolest statesmen ",[2] a public fast was fixed for Friday, February 16, when " every place of public worship was crowded and an unusual seriousness pervaded all ranks ".[3] Later on in the century the Rev. James Woodforde, in his *Diary*, wrote under December 8, 1776: " I gave notice of a Fast being kept on Friday next concerning the present War between America and us ", and on the said day, " read the Prayers appointed for the Fast " and " had as full a congregation as I have in an afternoon on a Sunday, very few that did not come ". Again, on Friday, April 19, 1793, ordered as a public fast, " France having declared war against us ", Parson Woodforde had a " large congregation ", though in his own case, if " the spirit " was " willing, the flesh was weak ", for after the pious aspiration, " Pray God our prayers may be accepted ", the *Diary* proceeds: " Dinner today rost loin of Pork ". However, on another general fast " appointed by His Majesty " for Wednesday, March 7, 1798, Woodforde reformed and dined on " salt fish, eggs and apple fritters ".

The nominally Christian Parliaments of the first Georges at least kept up some semblance of Christian principles, but

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[1] See Frere's *History of the English Church*, p. 102. [2] J. R. Green's *Short History of the English People*, p. 748. [3] *Life and Times of Selina, Countess of Huntingdon*, vol. i, p. 398.

our modern spiritual guides, while discountenancing any disturbance of the so-called "Reformation Settlement", have practically dropped any enforcement of one of the three good works which are as much an integral part of the Sermon on the Mount as the Beatitudes, and find a way of escape from the thorny subject of fasting by selecting Sundays for days of national supplication.

The Forms of Prayer themselves are open to criticism on several grounds. The order of the services reverses that of the Prayer-Book sequence of Matins, Litany and Holy Communion. By placing the Order of Holy Communion before those of Matins and Litany in these special forms, the compilers proclaim their acceptance of Morning Prayer with or without Litany as the principal service of the Lord's Day morning, an arrangement not contemplated either by the Tudor Reformers or by the seventeenth-century revisers of the Prayer-Book, which, following all antiquity, has consistently maintained the Mass as the crowning solemnity of Sunday worship to which the offices of Matins and Litany lead up. Other minor criticisms cannot now be dealt with.

E. Tritton Sankey.

CORRESPONDENCE

ALFRED FAWKES

To the Editor of Theology.

Sir,

I have been much interested in the articles on Alfred Fawkes. I had the pleasure of lunching with him in, I think, 1920 at his vicarage at Ashby St Ledgers.

I notice that St Deiniol's Library, Hawarden, has a book of his written in his Roman Catholic days, *The Sacred Heart: and Other Sermons*. The copy has the inscription "'With the author's compliments and respectful regards, October, 1894". It was evidently read by Mr Gladstone, for on page 86—towards the end of the book—there is a pencilled *ma* (Mr Gladstone's well-known way of expressing disapproval) against these words: "a small number of very rich men have been able to lay upon the masses of the poor a yoke little better than slavery itself." These words were not Fawkes's own, but a quotation from Leo XIII's Encyclical "On the Condition of Labour".

Fawkes also published in 1901 *The Passing of the Queen*, a sermon preached on the death of Queen Victoria.

Yours faithfully,

A. M. Coleman.

MISCELLANEA

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Dr Richards was Professor of Greek and Classical Literature in the University of Durham and Canon of Durham Cathedral from 1927 to 1934.

The Rev. D. R. Davies is Minister of Richmond Road Congregational Church, Cardiff, and the author of *On to Orthodoxy*, etc.

The Rev. H. R. McAdoo, formerly Scholar of Trinity College, Dublin, is now Curate of Holy Trinity Cathedral, Waterford.

The Rev. R. H. Fuller was a member of the Queen's College, Birmingham.

The Rev. E. Tritton Sankey was formerly Vicar of Christ Church, Clapton.

WILLIAM LAW IN GERMANY

Die Stufenfolge des Mystischen Erlebnisses (*i.e.*, *The Stages of Mystical Experience*) *bei William Law* (1686-1761), von Konrad Minkner.

This is a strikingly well produced large octavo volume of 164 pages, furnished with very numerous footnote quotations in three languages, published by a well-known Munich firm (approximately at 6 marks) somewhere about, indeed almost certainly some time after, the outbreak of the war. Its contents were accepted by the University of Marburg as a thesis for the author's doctorate of philosophy in 1938-9, he being a pupil of Professor Friedrich Heiler, who had suggested William Law as a subject. Heiler, whose great work on prayer is known and valued in this country, has been leader of the Lutheran " High Church Union ", and if not actually a member is in close sympathy with the persecuted Confessional Church. His position is thoroughly sacramentalist as well as ecumenical, and the treatment of the subject by his pupil reflects this. Minkner dedicates his book to the memory of his father, a " Missions-Superintendent ", who died in 1918.

William Law, who has been well called " our greatest English prose mystic ", is here introduced to the German public for the first time. English editions and studies of his mystical works are rare enough; and it is safe to say that no British publisher could have produced such a work as this in 1939 without serious financial loss. The present publication of such a book in Nazi Germany is therefore a portent full of hope. I am informed by a refugee pastor that, up to 1939 at least, much good and sound Christian literature has been printed and read

" in very large circles ", especially in the Confessional Church (presumably also among the Roman Catholics). Moreover, the all-pervading Nazi censorship has not usually attempted to interfere with books which avoided references to the current political situation. (One of only two such references here is Minkner's probably veiled comment, " this sounds like a prophecy of Bolshevism ", when quoting Law's words, " we are to suffer for our faith as the first Christians did ".) Germany is far from being the land of enforced spiritual darkness that our war propaganda depicts.[1]

The present reviewer, as author of several publications containing selections and studies of Law's mystical writings,[2] is unable to give a properly unbiased account of Minkner's work, more especially as his own works are quoted or mentioned, usually approvingly but sometimes critically, on about forty-five of its pages ! Its primary value is indeed clear enough. It lies in the book's truly super-confessional and super-national character in this time of the intensest of modern wars. Apart from this glorious fact, I am bound to feel inexpressibly thankful for any work which dwells, as this one does, with generous enthusiasm and tender affection on the words of this great master of the spiritual life, even though the resulting interpretation of his doctrines may be defective and may differ materially from my own in some respects. William Law himself is allowed to speak in some hundreds of quotations. Apart from him, Minkner, as other numerous quotations show, has found his principal guides to the nature of mystical religion in his teacher F. Heiler, in Evelyn Underhill, and in the French Abbé Henri Bremond. His attempt to arrange his subject systematically might be criticized as somewhat rigid and pedantic, and parts of his writing—*e.g.*, the sometimes disconnected accumulations of citations—give the impression of youth and inexperience. But these defects are in great part redeemed by his penetrating enthusiasm for his subject and by the evidence of a spirit which longs to know more of God in Christ through a study of the great mystics, particularly Jacob Boehme, Ruysbroeck, St Theresa, St John of the Cross, and St Francis de Sales, all beloved by Law himself.

[1] Up to last April, if not later, the monthly journal of the little German Quaker community, *Der Quäker*, has been allowed by the Nazi Government to appear regularly, even though some of its articles have been of a most distinctly pacifist tone. Thus it printed the translation (made in my home by a Jewish refugee) of a fine pacifist *Meditation on Peace* by Evelyn Underhill, which was passed by both the British and German censors (*via* Holland). It was through a short review of Minkner's book in this journal that the knowledge of its publication reached me.

[2] Particularly *Selected Mystical Writings of William Law, with Notes and twenty-four Studies* (The C. W. Daniel Co., 1938, 8s. 6d.).

Konrad Minkner's plan is to trace in his subject's writings the different stages of the typically Christian mystical experience, from the first awakening and purification of the spirit to its illumination and the final *unio mystica* with the Divine. He precedes his main argument with a discussion of the influence upon Law of the Oratorian Père Malebranche (1638-1715), as well as of Jacob Boehme (1575-1624), and follows it by sections dealing briefly with the connexion between Law's mystical experience and four outstanding doctrines of his theology, concluding with a summing up of his position as a mystic, especially in relation to the English mystics of the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries.

In the following respects at least the author's work seems to have a conspicuous and original value for all students of our mystic. (Incidentally, he has enriched the German language with the new word " Lawforschung "!) (1) Evidence is brought to show that we can justifiably make considerably more inferences as to the characteristics of Law's own religious experience than the extremely impersonal nature of his writings has been hitherto considered to warrant. (2) By frequent and well-selected quotations from the *Christian Perfection* (1729) and the *Serious Call* (1726), it is urged with much force that that experience was essentially " mystical " in the earlier period of his life, before his contact with Boehme (c. 1735). (3) There is a re-emphasis of (what up to the 1938 edition had been disregarded) the marked differences between the doctrines of Law and those of his " master " Boehme, and of " the large debt that we owe to Law in that he softened and modified Boehme's doctrine, so as to make it more readily acceptable to believers in the central truths of Catholic theology ". (4) The view (held by Overton and other Anglicans) of Law's generally consistent loyalty throughout his life to Anglican institutions, and in particular to the two great Sacraments, is vigorously defended with some effective illustrations (this in partial opposition to the present reviewer's interpretation of the evidence). (5) Some new indications are given of Law's debt to the great Catholic mystics, whom we know he studied, especially St John of the Cross and Ruysbroeck, as well as Malebranche and his " Omnia videmus in Deo ".

Hitherto William Law has been practically unknown in Germany. It is therefore a great satisfaction to read Konrad Minkner's emphatic assertion: " We may without hesitation place him among the greatest mystics of Western Christianity. The more one studies his works, the more one is impressed by the truly magnificent way in which he has, while preserving his own peculiar characteristics, made use of abundant treasures of thought drawn from the mystics of many different ages of Christendom."

There can, I fear, be little doubt that the only copy of Minkner's work available in these islands during the present war will be

that which has been secured by great good fortune by the London Library, St James's Square, S.W. 1 (to whose enterprise I am much indebted). But the book is assuredly being read by our German brothers in Christ, and we may confidently hope that, when the hour of liberation comes to us all, it will form a precious link in the achievement of some form of outward unity between us and them, such as can, in William Law's words, be grounded only on a far nearer approach to our "union with the inward spirit and outward form of Christ's life and behaviour in this world".

STEPHEN HOBHOUSE.

THE NEW LIDDELL AND SCOTT

THIS is at last complete. The first fasciculus appeared in 1925, the tenth and last in 1940. Technical notes have been printed in earlier issues of THEOLOGY, giving examples of cases where the new dictionary confirms the views taken by specialized New Testament lexicons, or else notably fails to do so. This time a more general appreciation will be appropriate.

In 1911 Mr, afterwards Sir Henry, Stuart Jones was appointed Editor; he died in 1939, just before the end. The Preface is fascinating; it reveals the magnitude of the task and the consummate skill with which it was tackled. A thesaurus of the Greek language was impossible; it would have run to 120 volumes—the extant mass of Greek literature is ten times that of Latin. Selection was necessary, demanding superb generalship, a small army of workers, international co-operation, and, of course, the traditional skill and tenacity of the Clarendon Press; all were to hand.

The subsidiary studies are particularly interesting even to enumerate. Greek medicine was entrusted to Dr Withington, who settled in Oxford for the purpose, to read the extant remains of Greek medical literature and leave his mark on nearly every page of the lexicon. Sir William Thistleton-Dyer was responsible for Botany, Sir Thomas Heath (who else?) for Mathematics, Professor D'Arcy Thompson for Natural History. Other workers undertook Astronomy, Astrology, Military tactics and engineering, etc. Outside these specialist studies much research was done on literature generally, especially on the later philosophers.

A careful examination of the treatment of characteristic New Testament words leads to the conclusion that Liddell and Scott rarely contributes anything that is not more clearly and fully set out in the specialist lexicons, especially Milligan and Moulton, Abbott-Smith, and Preuschen-Bauer; while Kittel's *Wörterbuch* remains indispensable for a study of the formative ideas of early

Christianity. But it is an immense help to see the familiar words in a background of general Greek literature.

The unprecedented richness of the help now available to the student leads one to reflect on the mental training given by the old classical education, which was without assistance from commentaries or lexicons on the modern scale. There are probably few now left who had my experience. In 1893 I went to an old-fashioned public school, having been crammed for a scholarship but never having tackled a Greek author (only short select passages). For the first day's work I had to prepare lines 1 to 40 of Euripides' *Medea*, in a little paper-covered text with only an occasional note on a rare grammatical form. No one thought of explaining to me how such a portent as a Greek play came into being. Presently I had to learn long passages by heart. I had been put in a form where all studies, except Greek and Latin (plus a little "Divinity", Greek Testament, and some Mathematics which could be evaded), had been given up, and that went on for six years. I suppose such training makes other studies undertaken in later life seem comparatively easy.

May the new Liddell and Scott revive the study of Greek! We need it more than any other nation. First, there is a natural affinity between the Greek with his μηδὲν ἄγαν doctrine and the Englishman with his characteristic under-statements. Secondly, our democracy goes back to ancient Athens; the resemblances, including the masses of the disinherited, are closer than we like to contemplate. Thirdly, we are marked out by Nature as the European nation to continue the Greek tradition. France, Italy and Spain will always cherish their Latin ancestry; Russia has repudiated the Byzantine elements through which Hellenism, greatly attenuated, reached her; Germany, for good or ill, is *sui generis*. Our difference from her is illustrated by the fact that English scientific vocabulary is of Greek origin, while German is predominantly native Teutonic.

W. K. L. C.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE CONFLICT IN ANGLICAN THEOLOGY

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

I have read with the greatest interest Mr Michael Bruce's article in your August number, and I hope you will be able to allow space for one of the older generation to reply. I entirely agree with Mr Bruce as to the reality of the rift in theology between the two generations; in fact, I believe it to be even

deeper than he thinks. But when he goes on to show us where exactly the rift lies, he appears to me to put his finger in the wrong place.

As regards the doctrine of the Church there is really nothing more serious than a difference of emphasis. We may all agree that the outward institution, which we call the Church on earth, has the nature of a sacrament, in so far as it really is the Church at all. All sacraments have both a symbolic and an instrumental aspect; they effect instrumentally the same reality which symbolically they *are*. Symbolically the outward Church is all that Mr Bruce says it is; and, when we look at it from this point of view, it is, as he says, blasphemous to talk about the Church's *task*, as though the Church existed to be the means of doing something in the world. Nevertheless the outward Church is not merely the symbol of the all-inclusive eternal reality, the Body of Christ. It also exists on earth to make actual the all-inclusiveness which as a symbol it already has. No doubt theologians of the older generation have emphasized the instrumental aspect of the Church's being in a one-sided way which needs the correction supplied by Mr Bruce. But to ignore the instrumental aspect altogether is just to play with words. Under this aspect the function of the Church is to convert the world, and by God's grace she must work to that end.

The real rift lies deeper; and Mr Bruce's *obiter dicta* on reason and revelation sufficiently disclose it. "Moderns" of every kind, whether they be ultra-orthodox Catholics, disciples of Karl Barth or of John Macmurray, or else simple Communists or Fascists, have one characteristic in common: they hate Liberalism, and their minds deliberately operate only within some closed system of thought which of course each identifies with the particular gospel which he professes. Between any adherent of a closed system and one who does not accept the system, no discussion can be fruitful or even possible; for there are no common principles on which discussion or mutual criticism can be based. A closed system is immune to criticism from outside. It is no accident that Professor Macmurray begins his fascinating *Clue to History* by defining his terms in such a way that any critic who does not accept his main position can at once be convicted of using those terms in a different sense from Macmurray's, so that the criticism is seen to be mere misunderstanding and irrelevance. To me the effect is much the same, when Mr Bruce lays it down that a non-Christian world-view is impossible; a world-view must be Christian or anti-Christian. This, I suspect, is only another way of saying that a non-Christian cannot possibly discuss or genuinely criticize Christian beliefs or doctrines; he can only attack them. And it follows that it is merely silly for the Christian to attempt to justify those beliefs and doctrines to the reason of the non-Christian critic. The only reply the Christian need or can make to the non-Christian who says "I don't under-

stand " or " I don't agree " is some form of the ancient repartee " Of course *you* wouldn't " (I am far from ridiculing the retort; it has a quite necessary place in Christian apologetic).

This, I suppose, is the sort of answer I must myself expect from theologians of the younger generation. But now I am only trying to persuade Mr Bruce to agree with me as to where we really differ. And it will perhaps tend to clarification if I state my own position in antithesis to what I understand to be his.

As a young man I belonged in thought to what was then " the older generation ", and now, of course, I am much further behind the times. I still differ fundamentally both from those who would make Christian truth into a closed system and from those who, like the older Liberals, think that there is nothing in that truth which is intellectually fixed or irreformable. On the contrary I believe that that which is fixed and irreformable in Christian truth is precisely that which prevents it from ever becoming a closed system; and I hold that thing to be the real identification (however theologically expressed) of the eternal universal Logos with the crucified man, Jesus.

Because Jesus is the Logos, He is dimly and partially revealed in the reason and conscience of every man, and therefore the Gospel must make its appeal to that reason and conscience in all men. Open-minded and critical discussion of Christianity on the part of non-Christians is not necessarily either futile or impossible. Moreover, it is better for a man to profess rejection of the Gospel than by a professed acceptance to do violence to the reason and conscience within him; for the latter would be a more fatal rejection of God. Therefore reason and conscience together are the test of revelation, and not *vice versa*, as Mr Bruce suggests. There can be no compromise on that point, in which the whole meaning of intellectual self-sacrifice is involved.

On the other hand, because the Logos is Jesus, reason and conscience—divinely given endowments as they are—cannot avail of themselves to bring any man to salvation. The life which has been saved is the life which has been forgiven through the Cross and has died and risen again in Christ. There is no other way. And in that new life reason and conscience are no longer the controlling authority; they have entered into the *agape* which alone solves their problems, while it transforms them.

The real point at issue is whether the historical revelation of redemption, foretold in the Old Testament and given in Jesus Christ, is, in and by itself, a closed and self-sufficient system of knowledge concerning God, or whether it is itself to be recognized as the complement of another revelation given in the reason and conscience of man and never effaced, however confused and darkened, by sin. On the answer to that question depends the whole value of those principles of the liberty (*libertas minor*) of

thought and conscience, which are the distinctively Hellenic contribution to Christian theology and life. The moderns, Christian and anti-Christian alike, seem set on repudiating everything in European culture which is derived from Greece. Some of us older ones are afraid that that repudiation will only deepen the darkness of the new dark age which Europe seems to be entering.

Mutual explanation may do something to heal the breach, at least between Christians. Mr Bruce may very well insist that what I have said about closed systems of thought does not apply to him, since he does not identify Christianity with any particular (revealed) world-view, but would call any world-view Christian when its superstructure of human reason rests on the foundation of the revealed truths. Nevertheless, if I am right, the real object of his argument about the Church is to make it appear that Christians on earth have been entrusted with certain revealed truths which, though not of course axiomatic or self-evident, are nevertheless the necessary foundation of all other truths and therefore not open to any kind of human judgment or criticism. That is why he is obliged to condemn any attempt to express Christian truths in terms which might commend them to the reason and conscience of the natural man; for to the natural man, in Mr Bruce's view, the great verities of the Christian faith, and therefore any Christian world-view, are necessarily repugnant. But this is to make Christianity, in effect, a closed system of revealed truth. Here lies the fundamental point of difference between the older generation and the younger. And, since the criteria of truth and right are in question, it is small wonder that discussion between the two generations should be so difficult.

Yours very truly,

OLIVER C. QUICK.

ALFRED FAWKES

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

In reply to the letter from Dr Major in your August issue I am extremely glad to note how few and small are the matters in issue between us concerning our old friend Alfred Fawkes.

(1) When I wrote of Fawkes's having been threatened with the anti-Modernist oath, I was using Fawkes's own word; but it was not my intention to suggest that the threat was official. I gathered from Fawkes that he felt it hanging over him like the sword of Damocles, although the sword was not actually released upon his devoted head.

(2) Dr Major asks—What is a "Modernist in the strict sense of the term"? Of course I am aware that, as he says, there are

many definitions of Modernism. But I had in mind its original use as applied to members of the Roman Church who retained their devotion to the institution, but reached certain conclusions from criticism of the Bible and Christian origins such as to divorce the doctrine of the Church from its traditional foundation in history. As Dr Rawlinson, the learned Bishop of Derby, has put the situation in his acute way, the Catholic Modernist represented dogma without history, while the Liberal Protestant retained the history without dogma. Perhaps there are some Anglicans of the Catholic Modernist position, or at least some whose position lies far enough in that direction to justify the application to them of the title " Modernist " on this purist principle.

I thought that I might have been held to have anticipated Dr Major's query by my own statement in THEOLOGY (July, at p. 11) that " having known Modernism in its own home, he (Fawkes) realized how different it was from the position of most Anglican Liberals ". I am now informed that in 1914 Fawkes wrote a letter to *The Times* protesting against the application of the term " Modernist " to Anglican Liberals on the ground that " it suggests M. Loisy and the Vatican Council as unmistakably as the *New Theology* suggests Mr R. J. Campbell and the City Temple " (*v. Modernism*, by M. D. Petre, at p. 101).

But even if there are those who do not greatly care for this label which is forced upon them, it is perhaps the only one which is available in order to distinguish a theological Liberal (or, *e.g.*, a High Churchman, who stands for freedom of intellectual investigation and speculation) who is not a Liberal Protestant. Now, however, the term has come to be used in a generic sense—as indeed it would not be unfair to say that Dr Major uses it—to include almost any person of liberal ecclesiastical or theological outlook, Roman, Anglican, or Nonconformist. Thus the term " Modernist " has been extended to include its old antithesis, " Liberal Protestant "; and even though the sharp controversy has passed, wherein the main protagonists were Loisy and Harnack, the tendencies remain. In spite of his close friendship with Loisy and Tyrrell, and what I have called " his large, embracing mind ", Fawkes in his Anglican days would have fallen on the whole into the category of Liberal Protestantism; and I think therefore that it is reasonable to have said that he was not a " Modernist in the strict sense of the term ".

J. W. B.-WORSLEY.

COMMENT ON THEOLOGICAL PERIODICALS

THE paper shortage does not yet seem to have much affected the spate of periodical literature. I propose herein very briefly to state the main themes of interest in the four categories I detect.

I. *Pastoral.*—In the spring numbers of nearly all these, attention was directed towards a thorough statement and examination of the pacifist position. The *Clergy Review* for June (Burns Oates and Washbourne, 2s.) concludes that we are fighting for Christianity, that there are evils worse than war, and that the Christian cause goes hand-in-hand with acknowledgement of failure and sinfulness. But the most profound study comes in the *Expository Times* for May (T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh, 10d.), where the recent publications on the moral issues received very careful treatment. This paper is boldly bringing out the challenging needs of our situation: in the July and August numbers the Rev. G. F. Allen has a strong essay on "The Prophetic Interpretation of History"; he recalls us to the Prophets' constant stress on the universality and wisdom of God's purpose, which includes and is not thwarted by Japanese, German and Italian aggression. The summer numbers have a course of Constructive Theology: "Reconciliation", expounded with a fearless orthodoxy, by Canon J. K. Mozley, "Authority in Religious Belief", by Prof. N. P. Williams, who shows that faithfulness to Scripture is not in itself enough, for you cannot derive the Creeds from Scripture; it was the Church that made the New Testament and not *vice versa*; "Revelation," by Prof. C. H. Dodd, in which he has with a triumphant concision given the outline of a Christian epistemology, without at the same time losing the numinous element, the divine initiative in the process: and finally "Justification," by the Rev. P. S. Watson, which is a modern treatment of the mainspring of the Reformation.

Practical minima of the Faith, very useful to chaplains at this time, are to be found in the *Clergy Review* for May, and in the Statement of the Christian Faith by the Archbishop of York in *Religion in Education* for July (S.C.M., 1s. 6d.).

II. *Learned.*—The bulk of these comes from America: two are occupied with religion in its broadest sense, with theology as a basic science. The *Harvard Theological Review* (H.U.P., 1 dollar) deals with aspects of classical religion, such as Mænadism, with the metaphysics of incarnation with a small "i," and with historical themes of more general interest such as Harvard Hymnody, by H. W. Foote, and the Quarrel between the Prophets and the Omri Dynasty by Herbert Parzen. The *Review of Religion* (Columbia U. P., 60 c.) is largely concerned with empirical religion and the nature of religious experience. The *Anglican Theological Review* has a timely reconsideration of the New Testament teaching on divorce, by Dr B. S. Easton; Professor C. C. Richardson devotes a long and well documented article to a scheme for reunion between Presbyterians and the Protestant Episcopal Church in U.S.A.

Perhaps it is from *Christianity and Society*—a very live journal edited by Reinhold Niebuhr, and published at 4s. per year by

the Fellowship of Socialist Christians—that I have derived most enjoyment and inspiration. The editorial is a brilliant review of the political scene throughout the world, but particularly in the Western hemisphere: " The identification between isolation and the ' perfect love ' of the Sermon on the Mount is the final fruit of the moral illusions of American protestantism." Next comes an article written in the very best and most attractive American by a Congregationalist Minister, under the heading " Religion leaves the Church " demanding a return of that emphasis on dogma, and of that symbolism in worship, which were apparently characteristic of the Church last time she found herself wrestling with the organized forces of a pagan opposition.

In England we have the *Journal of Theological Studies* (O.U.P., 5s.): Dr G. H. Boobyer writes an important article on the Marcan narrative of the Transfiguration, in which he minutely examines the nature of the " doxa " in the light of Hebrew Shekinah, and regards the Transfiguration as a type of the Second Coming. I am very sorry to read that *Christendom* is in such imminent danger of closing down. The June number had three very important articles on the English Situation, presented in preparation for the Summer School, which had to be postponed. T. S. Eliot claims that religious parties, since the Reformation, have been rather social than theological divisions, and that now with the passing of these separate social interests there is less room and justification for our sects. This is an extremely inadequate résumé of the position which I think he adopts—though perhaps I have misunderstood him, as there are moments when he is extremely obscure. Mr E. I. Watkin, from the Roman but not partisan point of view, deals with the relation between Christianity, culture and civilization, but is pessimistic about the chances of revival of a true and supernatural religion in our country, fearing rather a new ideal of liberal co-operation, for " man's eyes have been looking so long horizontally that he seems almost incapable of raising them to look upwards ". Mr Philip Mairet has a good diagnosis of the English diseased outlook upon Nature—or should I say the Natural Order ?

III. *Missionary.*—Emphasis is, of course, concentrated upon the problems in China, though I can do even less justice in this part than elsewhere to the important and exciting essays before me. In *The East and West Review* (S.P.C.K., 1s.) the articles of G. F. Allen from China, and of C. K. Sansbury from Japan, show the amazing courage of their respective missions in the unprecedented problems that confront them. The *Eastern Churches Quarterly* (G. E. J. Coldwell Ltd., 1s.) is more concerned with the impact of the Liturgy upon the ancient Churches of the nearer East. The *International Review of Missions* (O.U.P., 3s.) does its job so adequately as to preclude a summary: it treats

not only of what is happening, but also of the deeper ethical questions, the why and whither.

IV. *Partisan.*—In this class there is a manifest absence of anything representing the central Anglican tradition: readers of THEOLOGY cannot by now be unaware of the great and urgent need to use the Press *ad propagandam fidem*. At the moment the Church of England, as I know it, is poorer in this direction than many of its parties. The nearest attempt to a Christian paper for the average, not uninstructed, layman is the thin quarterly the *English Catholic*, in which we do find a good article on the " Anaphora ", by the Rev. C. E. Pocknee; but for the rest the atmosphere is too militant, and though it militates for the right things, it seems to be at the moment baying at the moon. At the other end of the scale there is *The Churchman* (Church Book Room, 1s.)—in which the party consciousness almost makes the name a *lucus a non lucendo*, and which can in these times find no better use for its paper ration than to reprint an article written by Dr Ryle in 1879! There are two articles however of more relevance: historians will read with interest the article by Mr F. D. Cope on " The Black Death ", and we should all read with interest and deep sympathy the article on Czechoslovakia, by Jindra, a Czech.

I pass finally in this class to four numbers of *The Modern Churchman* (Basil Blackwell, 1s. monthly). Throughout the modernism advocated seems to me a long time outmoded—as instance of this I cite the strong anti-dogmatic bias in Professor S. A. Cook's article on " The Future of Theology " (July), or the fearfulness of committing himself in the Editor's account of the Resurrection. Christian doctrine seems to be little more than a Stoic wisdom you can find in Marcus Aurelius, and endeavours are made to hammer Christian theology into conformity with the common-sense wisdom of the world. This equation of Christianity with philanthropy is relieved by a strong statement of the doctrine of the Fall, by the Rev. G. F. Allen, under the title " Beyond Good and Evil ", in the June number.

R. G. LUNT.

BOOK REVIEWS

FATHERS AND HERETICS: SIX STUDIES IN DOGMATIC FAITH, WITH PROLOGUE AND EPILOGUE. BEING THE BAMPTON LECTURES FOR 1940. By G. L. Prestige. S.P.C.K. 12s. 6d.

From the age of Queen Elizabeth onwards Patristic theology has made a special appeal to Anglican divines. Bishop Bull's Defence of the Nicene Creed is one of the most notable in a series of works that show how seriously theologians and apologists of the Church of England have taken that appeal to the mind and practice of the ancient Catholic Church. The Oxford Movement broke no fresh ground in this respect, though its emphasis upon primitive standards was something new if viewed simply in comparison with the Deism of the previous century and the rational, orthodox, replies to it. And when we pass from the first decades of the Movement to the latter years of the Victorian era, we find the volume in which the post-Tractarians most clearly expressed their standpoint—namely, *Lux Mundi*—thoroughly patristic in its atmosphere, if not always in its particular expositions of doctrine. The authors were hardly at all in debt either to Continental Protestantism or to the Counter-Reformation.

This interest in the heritage of the Fathers was less prominent in the theological work of Anglican writers during the opening years of the present century. The centre of discussion had shifted. Biblical problems which were destined to lead up to a concentration upon the nature of Biblical theology, and controversies that involved the examination of the concept of the supernatural, came into prominence. The issues associated with the subjects of the Kingdom of God and its interpretation, of miracle, and of Modernism, did not naturally send scholars to the Fathers. Moreover, when in the third decade the name of Karl Barth was more and more suggesting a church bell tolled in alarm, if I may employ his famous illustration, the fields to which theologians looked for the understanding and proclaiming of the doctrine of the Word of God were the Bible itself and the writings of the Reformers. The theology of the first five centuries was not directly relevant to the question which Barth and others raised and to the answer which they gave, at least in respect of the form both of the question and of the answer.

But the Anglican interest in patristic theology, though for a time obscured by more pressing concerns, was far from dead. And the moment that attention was directed towards the great doctrines of the Christian faith and their formulation, the

contributions made by the Fathers were once again expounded and assessed. In 1928 there appeared *Essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation*, a composite volume edited by Dr Rawlinson. It is significant that the names of Barth and Brunner are not to be found in the index, though it should also be remembered that Brunner in *TheMediator* was to make a great contribution to Christology, and that in the first volume of the English translation of his *Church Dogmatics* Barth was to expound the doctrine of the Trinity with an acumen and a fulness that would, simply by themselves, have sufficed to secure him very high rank as a theologian. And neither Brunner nor Barth was so much taken up with the Reformers as to be indifferent to the Fathers. In 1936 Dr Prestige published his book *God in Patristic Thought*, which clarified the history of doctrinal progress, not least in respect of some of the technical terms. In the course of the last year an important contribution to the understanding of the Alexandrine and Antiochene Christologies and of their mutual relations and antipathies has seen the light in Dr Sellers' *Two Ancient Christologies*; and now, finally, we have Dr Prestige again in his Bampton Lectures. If the clergy want to know what classical, positive, theology is they have some very good material ready for their assimilation.

The most immediately obvious merit about Dr Prestige's new book is its easiness to read. Naturally there are some passages which have to be taken slowly in view of the technical and, sometimes, involved subject-matter. But anyone gifted with ordinary intelligence and a desire to know how it was that Christian beliefs about God and Christ took the forms with which he was familiar would find this volume a most excellent guide-book, clear, full of human as well as of scientific interest, definite in its judgments but obviously fair and, in the right sense of the word, sympathetic to the persons whose place in the history of theological movement is so admirably delineated.

The first chaper is devoted largely to an examination of the word " tradition ", and to an exposition of its root meaning in primitive Christian thought, which Dr Prestige affirms to be the delivery rather than the transmission of authoritative truth. The importance of this result of a well-documented argument is to relieve the notion of tradition of the disparagement which, whether rightly or wrongly, often attaches to it, when it is supposed to imply nothing more than fidelity to the past. Valuable also, though less original, is the stress upon the appeal of the Fathers to the Scriptures as the basis of theology. This prologue is followed by the six chapters which describe the theological movement as it reached certain critical points. Callistus is the first name, and his significance is expounded in the context of the Church's belief in the true divinity of Jesus the Saviour and rejection of the different forms of Monarchianism, which either reduced His divinity to divine inspiration or

identified, crudely or philosophically, the Persons of the Father and the Son. The next chapter, " Origen: the Claims of Religious Intelligence ", shows Dr Prestige at his best. His praise of Origen, that to him first and foremost the Church owes it that " whenever Christianity is true to itself it is rational faith ", is very pertinent to-day. The exposition of the nature of Origen's allegorical interpretation of the Scriptures is an illuminating justification of that method. To this succeeds the lecture on " Athanasius: the Unity of God ". The greatness of the man is made plain; the importance of the theologian admirably defined, both as to the doctrine of God and as to the doctrine of revelation. But I am not happy with Dr Prestige's brief statement of the heresy of Arius that " though he recognized the divine Son as an inferior deity, he reduced the divine principle embodied in Him to an impersonal force of divine inspiration ". The words " impersonal " and " inspiration " do not well cohere with the theology to which the remaining fragments of Arius' writings point. It is also a curious phrase, if nothing more, when Dr Prestige speaks in connexion with Origen of " the derivation of the Godhead from its sources in the Father ". One may rightly speak of the derivation of the divine Persons of the Son and the Spirit " from the sole ultimate being of the Father ", as Dr Prestige does elsewhere; but hardly of the Godhead. The next three chapters bring before us the story of the Christological controversies. Amid this tremendous clash of personalities and doctrines, any student of that period must feel the difficulty of controlling natural preferences in the interests of a general justice; he will be conscious also of the pitfalls which await him if he fails to keep to the true track in his investigation of the relevant terminology. Dr Prestige keeps both his head and his feet. Apollinaris, Nestorius, and Cyril come to life in his pages, both as men and as teachers. For Apollinaris, apart from his particular heresy, which is interpreted as in part an attempt to frame a scientific Christology before the time was ripe, he has a very high regard. It was his " supreme merit . . . that he plotted the right course by insisting on the unity of Christ's Person ". He was " in the main . . . magnificently right. Jesus Christ was God and was doing God's work; and the fact that He did it is more important than the question how ". The positions and mutual misunderstandings of Cyril and Nestorius are clearly and, as a whole, very truly represented. But I am not sure that there was not more real theological difference, as distinct from that of terminological usage and of inherited traditions, than Dr Prestige allows. This may be suggested even though there is much to be said for Dr Prestige's conception of Nestorius' error as being negative rather than positive, a failure to adjust the truths of the two natures and the one Person and not a doctrine of two Persons. Excellent is the discussion of Cyril's theology, which appears as extremely

impressive on the positive side. I am, however, not sure that Dr Prestige is not over-confident in his view that the word φύσις as it is employed in Cyril's Christology means a " concrete ' personality ' " and not nature in the abstract. For a student of modern Christology the pages on the notions of " addition " and " emptying " in relation to the Incarnation, as they are found in Gregory of Nazianzus and Cyril, have the special interest of revealing a link between patristic thought and the very remarkable expositions of " kenosis " and " plerosis " in Dr Forsyth's greatest work, *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ.*

The Epilogue is entitled " Eros: or Devotion to the Sacred Humanity ". It is a valuable short account of a particular form of Christian devotion, appreciative but not without a note of warning, wherein is included a consideration of what is true and what is dangerous in the formula, *Lex orandi Lex credendi.* It leaves the same impression as does the rest of the book, that Dr Prestige knows well the difference between centre and circumference. Not to err in this is one of the indispensable marks of the real theologian.

J. K. Mozley.

Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction: Studies in Modern Social Structure. By Karl Mannheim. Routledge. 16s. 6d.

Many of those who view with the deepest apprehension the coming of a centrally planned and controlled society would admit that its advent in this country is now inevitable. The day-to-day necessities of the national war-effort have compelled the Government to assume control of persons and property. Although the control is still to a large extent theoretical, and probably incapable of concrete application without far more radical social and political changes than we are prepared for, we may say that at the abstract political level the decision has been taken. In theory—and something more than theory—we are a totalitarian society to-day. True, we remain a democracy; and the right of Parliament to criticize, challenge, and if need be repudiate the methods by which the Government puts its control of persons and property into practice is, at present, unimpaired. So is the right of the Judiciary to interpret the regulations by which the Government defines the exercise of its seemingly absolute powers. Therefore, it would probably exceed the wit of man to describe faithfully the order of society under which we are now living.

But that centralized control is increasing, by leaps and bounds, is indubitable. It is the planning that is more doubtful. For planning demands the co-ordination of controls, so that they shall not work against one another. And although that seems simple enough in theory, at least in a war-situation, it involves

difficult decisions. It requires a very far-reaching agreement on what are called "priorities", and these can be determined only by reference to a scale of human values. My local country newspaper this week is, for example, rightly perturbed by the practice of ploughing up playing-fields, which have cost such pains to secure. Food is vitally important; but health depends upon more than a sufficiency of food. And this adjudication between the narrower and the wider demand, between the claim of the immediate present and the remoter future is essential to the planning of society.

Reluctantly, perhaps, but irrevocably we have passed out of the era of *laissez-faire*. No-one to-day effectively believes that a viable society, still less a social harmony, can be produced by the pursuit of private interest regulated merely by the law of contract. The necessity of a large measure of control by the State is universally admitted. But how far it ought to go—this is a question on which widely different opinions are held. And it is probably Utopian to expect that any general agreement will be reached much in advance of the compulsion of events. But if it is not reached beforehand, we may fear the worst.

There is no time to be lost. The opportunities and the dangers of a war-situation are equally great. War provides a common social purpose incomparably more compulsive than any operative in peace. On the other hand it incredibly intensifies the pace of social development. It gives the opportunity of doing great things in reshaping society; but the penalties it exacts for *missing* those opportunities are appalling. If, as seems probable, we have entered upon a period of history when the war situation is endemic, and the possibilities of intensive social organization are of a new order—two corollary aspects of the same basic social situation—the tempo of social change is likely to become breathless.

Karl Mannheim's remarkable book is a kind of prolegomena to an understanding of this epoch of breakneck social change. It is addressed primarily to Britons—to persuade them to think ahead into the coming society, and by the exercise of imaginative foresight to secure that it shall be, as far as possible, "planned for freedom". The element of paradox which the average British mind finds in that phrase is indicative of the mental revolution Mannheim requires of us. His argument is dressed in sober and scientific language; but the burden of it is formidable. It amounts to this: Freedom in the traditional British sense—of freedom against the State—we cannot have; if we insist on retaining it, we shall create an anarchy which will invite, or indeed compel, a dictatorial order. But if we realize that the advent of "totalitarianism" is symptomatic of a universal change of the structure of society from *laissez-faire* to a planned society, and take warning by it, we shall prepare ourselves to discard the freedoms which at the present stage of social develop-

ment are anarchic, and concentrate on retaining only those that can be reconciled with the necessary degree of central control. But in order to do this effectively we must accept the social techniques of the totalitarian societies, and recognize that they are in themselves neutral, and as capable of being used to good ends as bad.

There is no longer any choice between planning and *laissez faire*, but only between good planning and bad. The author himself would rather live in a period in which the social order and the techniques of control did not allow one group of people to force its conception of " the good life " upon another. But we have no power to choose the social order and its technique of control. They are already in existence, and the most we can do is to combine and mould them to the best advantage.

In other words, there is no avoiding a society in which " the key-positions " are in the hands of a relatively few persons. Let us see to it, if we can, that these persons are such as are capable of acting in the best interests of society as a whole. For this purpose the traditional apparatus of democratic control is inadequate. It was appropriate to the time when " democracy " was a virtual oligarchy, in that it worked through an *élite* chosen by other methods. But the mass-democracy of modern society is a very different thing. It is in the main the product of an increasingly " rationalized " industrialism, which at the same time that it imposes a pattern of behaviour upon its victim takes away from him the opportunity of responsibility and unfits him for independent existence if the industrial machine slows down or breaks down. Conditioned to a way of life in which initiative is not required of him, when the scaffolding of his life is withdrawn he is bewildered and turns desperately towards a new dependence. From such material, at the present stage of social organization, positive control in the interests of democracy cannot be expected; and in fact democratic theory collapses.

From this angle the essential to social stability is the security of the masses. On the basis of a new security, development towards positive democracy is conceivable. But " negative democratization " plus insecurity invites dictatorship. The problem therefore appears to be whether an *élite* occupying the key-positions is capable of conceiving its final goal as the creation of a new form of democracy, and laying the foundations by establishing a new security for the masses. The pseudo-security of the dole is totally inadequate for this purpose: for it does not touch the core of insecurity, which is the collapse of a life-pattern. Here the war-situation may be fatally misleading: for the absorption of millions of men into war-production and the armed forces is a temporary evasion of a problem which will become far more acute in peace. From

this point of view war is the euphoria before death of capitalist society; and a society planned for war is—by virtue of its very likeness—the absolute negation of a society planned for peace.

But that is a digression—a wandering along one of the innumerable paths which Mannheim opens. The substantial question is how to reconcile the planned society, where the key-positions are in the hands of a relatively small group, with the positive values of democracy. The short-term possibility of such a reconciliation depends upon the moral and intellectual quality of the ruling minority. If this could be disinterestedly concerned with the good of society as a whole, then it could incorporate into its plan of society the necessary enclaves of freedom. Chief of these would be freedom for responsible criticism. But irresponsible criticism aimed at exploiting and exacerbating mass-resentment could not be tolerated. Further, the resources of modern propaganda would be employed in the work of positive education and the promulgation of the ideal of peaceful co-operation within the nations and between the nations. But above all the plan of society would deliberately aim at encouraging the formation of independent and experimental groups, provided their activities did not positively conflict with the functioning of society as a whole. There is no reason why they should if their members were conscious of the distinction between anarchic and co-operative freedom.

If the best happens, the occupants of the key-positions will remain under democratic control. But that will only be possible if democratic control is responsibly exercised; and that in turn depends upon the apparatus of democracy ceasing to be a façade behind which interested groups strive for a monopoly of the key-positions. Indeed, the possibility of passing to a democratic and planned society without catastrophe depends upon the emergence of a new sense of social responsibility, and the acceptance of a new conception of freedom. As Mannheim says, " What is the use of freedom to choose our own philosophy of life, to form our own opinions, if the sociological mechanisms of our society create insecurity, anxiety, neuroses, which prevent us from making sound and rational decisions ?" We have reached the stage in which we can be effectively free, not against society, but only through society; yet only in so far as society is rationally directed as a whole, and our fears of insecurity finally dispersed, shall we give up our habit of clinging to the freedoms which are anarchic and create the insecurity against which we suppose them to insure us. Extant totalitarianism abolishes the anarchic freedom but denies the new freedom of a society consciously planned towards the realization of responsible democracy, and guarded against bureaucratic abuses by democratic safeguards at the new level.

But in the storm of war the port is hard to make. It is hard even to persuade people that it is necessary to make it: for war

is an escape for the politician and for society from their own deep dilemmas. War creates the appearance of a planned society, but not the reality; and it creates this appearance at the cost of an intolerable draft upon our future flexibility. Our power of future adjustment (and even of present achievement) is being culpably wasted by the refusal or the inability of our leaders to think courageously of our social destiny. In the ardour of common defence conflicts of interest might be permanently reconciled, social motives permanently changed, a new social ideal permanently established, by a leadership which understood the nature of our predicament. But war offers an easy and fatal way of evasion. We project on the Nazis the evils with which we have not the courage to grapple, as the Nazis projected the evils with which Germany refused to grapple on to us. Thus is democracy defeated. "At a certain stage of social development it is not enough to leave external trends to themselves; we need a new type of man who can see the right thing to do, and new political groups who will do it."

J. Middleton Murry.

The Pope Speaks. Being a compilation of his allocutions, messages, broadcasts, and encyclicals since his accession to the Holy See, together with a biography and current précis by Charles Rankin of all his efforts for peace since 1917, when he handed to the Kaiser the peace plan of Pope Benedict XV; with a preface by Cardinal Hinsley. Faber. 7s. 6d.

To have set forth the full title of this book saves further description of its contents, and I can at once pass to criticism. It is a book which unavoidably raises the suspicion of having been inspired by the desire to enlist the Pope on the side of the Allies in the war. True, he is referred to pointedly as "the greatest neutral", but Mr Rankin—whose writing is rather lumbering—has included *in extenso* in his "current précis" a broadcast by Cardinal Hinsley which unwary readers may suppose to be but the extreme statement of the Pope's own views. Such an impression will be wrong. Of course the Pope has condoled with the sovereigns whose small countries have suffered unprovoked invasion, and of course he has pilloried with all the vigour of his forensic eloquence the reported persecution of Roman Catholics in areas such as Poland. But a study of the texts printed here shows that, assuming the compilation to be exhaustive, His Holiness has never voiced explicit approval of the waging of war by Britain and France. He has reproved what in his eyes have been outrageous wrongs; he has not urged that force should triumph on one side or the other. On the contrary, before the war he repeatedly urged the peaceful

settlement of international differences, and since it began he has more than once expressed the hope that there might be an early peace based on justice.

His utterances in this respect impress by their sense and moderation, but to read them is to see why they have remained entirely without effect. The Popes, now that they no longer rank among temporal rulers, stand so thoroughly aloof that they overlook the strength of political and economic rivalries and the force of popular passions. Their counsels of perfection, admirable in sentiment, are divorced from reality. Their advice is ignored, not owing to the godlessness of the world, but owing to its own lack of worldliness.

If, however, the book thus throws into relief the inherent ineffectuality of the papal sermons to statesmen and diplomatists, it also contains passages addressed to the individual Christian, and at least these can be heeded. We are only too prone in time of war to forget our Christian duties, and yet it is then especially that there is such ample opportunity for the practice of charity and humility.

MONTGOMERY BELGION.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY, VOL. XXIV, 1938. Oxford University Press. 30s.

Apart from the more purely business items of the Academy, this volume contains nine articles on a variety of topics. Limitations of space make it impossible to give more than a mention of items which may well be of interest to readers of THEOLOGY.

The Raleigh Lecture by Bertram Thomas on "Arab Rule under the Al Bu Sa'id Dynasty of Oman" is a very readable account of the domestic history of a corner of Arabia during the last century and a half: while the Shakespeare Lecture by L. L. Schücking on "The Baroque Character of the Elizabethan Tragic Hero" and the Warton Lecture on English Poetry by A. M. D. Hughes on "The Theology of Shelley" are full of interesting detail. In contrast to the careful and exact treatment of his subject by Sir Frederick Kenyon in his essay on "The Western Text in the Gospels and Acts", which is largely a consideration of Professor A. C. Clark's treatment of the subject, is the more discursive but not less valuable work of three other contributors to this volume. Sir D. Tovey's lecture on "The Main Stream of Music", Osborn Bergin's consideration of some aspects of the history of Irish language in "The Native Irish Grammarian", and Evelyn Jamison's lecture on "The Sicilian Norman Kingdom in the Mind of Anglo-Norman Contemporaries", will all repay many times over the effort of reading them.

There remain two lectures which in very diverse ways are of

interest to the contemporary student of religious thought and life.

" Some Problems of the Philosophy of History " by G. C. Field contains some very pertinent matter in view of the general revival of considerations of the relevance of philosophy in many fields of study, and is certainly worth the attention of those concerned with the historical basis of religion. The lecturer contends that philosophy must be critical of a tendency to approach one field of study with the presuppositions of a different one, and that more weight should be allowed to history as a formative element of its approach. Beginning with the threefold assumption " that we necessarily assume that something really happened in the past, that this cannot be an object of direct inspection or acquaintance to us, and that, in spite of this, it is possible to make intelligible or significant judgements about it ", objections from several points of view are discussed, and the lecture ends with a positive proposition on the general structure of historical thinking. The merit of the lecture, apart from its positive contributions, lies in its power to stimulate the reader to further thinking.

Sir S. Radhakrishnan's lecture on " Gautama the Buddha " in its compass of some forty pages provides an extraordinarily interesting and useful outline of the life and teaching of Buddha. The publisher states that the papers contained in this volume are issued by him in a separate form, and one could hardly imagine a better introduction to a study of this particular subject than this lecture. The only criticism is, that while the lecturer is scrupulously fair, he misunderstands the Christian idea of God, and actually sets up against it a statement which is in fact an admirable epitome of the Christian concept—" The divine exists, not by virtue of any relationship to or comparison with other things, but in its own right . . . ".

In conclusion it remains to say that the volume is admirably bound and, as would be expected, finely printed.

C. D. Waddams.

Good God. By John Hadham. Penguin Books Ltd. 6d.

No more arresting an essay in apologetics has been written since Chesterton published *Orthodoxy* thirty years ago than *Good God*, a Penguin special which it is to be hoped will be published in a more durable form. Mr Hadham's book is pungently, incisively and wittily written; some readers will probably regard the early chapters as irreverent and even blasphemous, but they will be mistaken; it is as earnest and trenchant a contribution to Christian argument as many a Bampton or Gifford Lecture. Mr Hadham's chapters are short, many are brilliant: the discussion of the flea is a case in point. Chapter III is an excellent restatement of the teleological argu-

ment; the joyous adventure of creation is finely illustrated, and he says truly that "God must have a special affection for the ordinary man". A central theme, and a debatable one, with our author is that "the more important a matter is, the more impossible it is to prove it." Much depends here upon the meaning attached to proof. So also not all readers will agree with the author that all knowledge of God is subjective (p. 44). But Chapter VIII is a masterpiece of brevity: it makes clear that the world having got into a very bad mess, the Creator (who in Mr Hadham's opinion is ultimately responsible) determined upon a decisive act of initiative: "God decided that the moment had arrived in the year we call B.C. 4." The subsequent discussion of "God-in-a-human-life" is quite masterly, even although the reader may not accept the doctrine of the final restitution of all things. Some critics, too, will dislike the too brief comment on the Eucharist (p. 59): "the folly of the controversies which have surrounded this meal." A deeper exposition is wanted here. With the author's insistence on growth and development in religion and religious experience there will be general sympathy: "If we don't know a great deal more about Jesus of Nazareth now than did the first disciples, then we ought to be ashamed of ourselves." Chapter XI is in many respects a noble and moving discussion of the Cross. In Chapter XII the "mysterious resurrection" is described as almost objectively proved. Chapter XIII boldly advances the thesis of universal perfectionism: "just because God-in-a-human-life was *God* in a human life." Many readers will find echoes of Robert Browning throughout these pages, and some may even discern the influence of Stephen Leacock and P. G. Wodehouse. Nevertheless, Chapter XVI strikes new and important ground in dissociating economics, politics, imperialisms and utopias from theology. But what will readers of von Hügel say when they find Mr Hadham declaring that "it is quite impossible to fool God by 'worshipping' Him"? "God is not interested in being worshipped." Has Mr Hadham forgotten or discarded the psalms? The closing chapters, XIX to XXI, skate too easily over thin ice, and the discussion on the present war will arouse opposition. But our author regains his readers' sympathy in the simple and moving epilogue: "To know God at all is to love Him. Singleness of purpose, the simplicity of humility, courage, patience, humour, generosity—these are qualities attractive in creation and still more attractive in God Himself."

A. A. Cock.

The Resurrection of the Bible. By G. B. Bentley. Signposts, No. 4. Dacre Press. 1s.

The command "As you were" is one of the most ancient commands of the British Army. History too knows movements

which have made that command their rallying cry. But the stream of time moves in one direction only. The attempt to return to a former position may create the new or may produce a pitiful imitation. The one thing it never does is to recreate the past. In history the command " As you were " cannot be obeyed.

It was the tendency of the critical movement to turn theology into anthropology and the tokens of the actions of God into the witness of the religious experience of man. To-day, as Mr Bentley rightly notes, there is going on a reaction from the presuppositions of Liberalism, a return to a position in the tradition of the ancient honouring of the Bible as the Word of God. Mr Bentley would press this return, would assert that this return must be a return to the position held by St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas. He would use the language of " inerrancy ". Thus he says:

> By the doctrine of inerrancy we are assured that the writers have made no error, but have faithfully and accurately transmitted what God would have us know (p. 82).

Yet he is compelled to admit that

> The sacred historians of the Bible were subject to the usual limitations in that they had to make the best of such documents and oral traditions as were available; for there is no evidence that their knowledge of the past was increased by revelation (p. 103).

This admission means that he cannot restate the doctrine of the authority of Scripture as if the critical movement had not taken place: while by insisting on the use of the word " inerrancy " he is providing a trap for the unlearned.

The revelation is the action of God in Jesus Christ. Scripture and Church are witnesses to and tokens of that revelation. As witnesses they can give good witness without being inerrant. As tokens they can themselves be within the field of the revelation without being infallible. The treasure that God has given to us is contained in earthen vessels. We neither honour nor protect that treasure by pretending that the vessels are made of more honourable materials than the materials that God has chosen for his use.

Mr Bentley's book is small but significant. After the period of Liberalism there will come the swing of the pendulum to the opposite extreme. This is the new danger to which biblical scholarship and the Christian Faith are likely to be exposed.

J. O. Cobham.

The Prayer Book Reform Movement. By A. Elliott Peaston. Blackwell. 7s. 6d.

The importance of Mr Elliott Peaston's work lies in his unique treatment of the subject. Generally speaking, he has limited

himself to the eighteenth century and to reforms of the Prayer Book of the Church of England which have been prompted by deviations from the strict standard of orthodox Trinitarianism. Incidentally, he glances at certain liturgies compiled by Unitarian congregations from non-Anglican sources. Mr Peaston is fairly full in his treatment, although his bibliography is uneven. Mention should be made of the history of the Old Chapel, Dukinfield, by the late Principal Gordon, where the introduction of a modified version of J. J. Tayler's liturgy is described. The description of the ill-fated experiment of the Octagon Chapel at Liverpool should have drawn more fully upon the story of the Renshaw Street Congregation edited by Mr G. Eyre Evans and of *Walking Together* by Miss Anne Holt. Mr Peaston would have done well to have continued his list of Unitarian liturgies into more recent times. Mention should be made of the compilations of Dr Estlin Carpenter, of Dr L. P. Jacks, and of *Orders of Worship*. Miss Holt gives a useful description of the introduction of a liturgy at Ullet Road Church, Liverpool, by Dr Klein, whilst the biography of Mrs Humphry Ward contains some interesting liturgical criticisms of the opening service in the chapel of Manchester College, Oxford.

The Trinitarian controversy commences in the post-Reformation Church of England with the issue of the Socinian Tracts during the closing years of the seventeenth century. A group of Anglican clergymen challenged Athanasian orthodoxy and provoked a Unitarian controversy. For the most part, they were high Arians in Christology. A certain discontent with the structure of the Prayer Book was occasioned. Shortly after, liturgical revision was undertaken by two Arian clergymen, Dr Samuel Clarke and Wm Whiston. Dr Clarke contented himself with a revision in the light of Arian Christology, but Whiston, while agreeing in this particular with Dr Clarke, added to his revision certain features of the Primitive Liturgies, such as the oblation in the Eucharist. Dr Clarke afforded the model for many revisions, such as that at Boston and that of the English congregation at Dunkirk (which Mr Peaston fails to mention). Later on, a school of divines arose at Cambridge who were definitely Socinian. The best known, Theophilus Lindsey, left the Church of England in 1773 to found the first congregation in England to be openly Unitarian, that of Essex Street Chapel, London. His liturgy went far beyond Clarke in theological radicalism and proved the forerunner of many Unitarian prayer books. In the 1789 edition he excised the Apostles' Creed, but Mr Peaston should have further mentioned that it was still used in worship by Arian ministers. Principal Gordon recalled hearing it recited by the congregation at Alcester as late as 1862, where the minister, Samuel Warren, was a high Arian. At a still later date, Unitarian liturgiology was further influenced by Charles Voysey, who, after his expulsion from the

vicarage of Healaugh in 1871, revised the Book of Common Prayer and adapted it to purely Theistic worship.

A curious byway of liturgical study is opened out by Mr Peaston's book, but it does not go far enough. More should be made of the extent to which some Arian and Socinian clergy during the eighteenth century modified the services in their churches on their own account, usually without episcopal rebuke. This was true not only of Dr Disney, but of three Irish bishops and a good many other clergy. Nor does Mr Peaston drive home a legitimate conclusion, that of the disturbed state of Anglican Christology from the Reformation onwards. He would have done well to have given some attention to the whole question of the Open Trusts of the Puritan chapels. It is not without bearing upon his subject. His treatment is too limited, but he is deserving of thanks for providing a study of a subject of a very real importance but which has not attracted a previous author, even though much unpublished research was done by the late Rev. C. E. Pike.

F. H. Amphlett Micklewright.

Fifty Years in London (1889-1939). By A. F. Winnington-Ingram. Longmans. 10s. 6d.

The publication of a new book by the Right Reverend A. F. Winnington-Ingram, better known to thousands of English-speaking people both in England and overseas as *the* Bishop of London, is an event of importance to his friends and admirers. The Bishop, for many years a popular Church dignitary, is singularly endowed with the gift of charm, and he has earned a safe place in the affections of many people. Something of the same charm is revealed in the pages of this book, a series of reminiscences of the time he served the Church in London.

Full of what is called " human interest ", the book throws considerable light upon the author's own personality. There is about the Bishop a touch of greatness which is readily recognized by all who know him and his work for the Church; and he is a man who loves widely and dispenses charm and kindness freely. But, unacquainted with the bitterness of failure and endowed with social and material advantages, he looks upon life from a privileged position. The whole book is permeated with a spirit of optimism of one who is naively self-conscious about his own success in life.

The Church historian will find things to interest him in the Bishop's reminiscences. Sidelights are thrown upon important topics of ecclesiastical controversy, such as the ritual question in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the marriage problem. The relations between Church and State, royal connexions with ecclesiastical matters, the part played by the

Church in the Great War, and contacts of the English Church with its sister Churches in the Empire and in America—all these subjects are touched upon in so far as they affected the life and work of the Bishop. But perhaps the most interesting point of the book to the Church historian will be its illustration of the variety and of the importance of the work of a present-day Bishop of the great diocese of London. From the point of view of one interested in the character and work of the author himself, the most valuable part of the book is the section which deals with his time at Oxford House and as Bishop of Stepney: it was in that period of his life that, to my mind, his greatness was most in evidence and his work least spoiled by his naive egocentricity.

It is, I think, a pity that the Bishop has written this book. He would have been well advised to have left it for someone else to write of the great work done by the young Winnington-Ingram in the East End of London.

L. J. Collins.

Romanism and Evangelical Christianity: A Study of Origins and Development. By Francis J. Paul. Hodder and Stoughton. 16s.

For 300 years anti-Roman polemic has occupied a considerable place in the theological writing of Europe. Sometimes the challenge provided by the precise Roman formulations has been creative, and great theology has been produced in the heat of controversy—as more than once in the seventeenth century. But in latter years the ground to be fought over has become so familiar that there seems little purpose in such a work as Professor Paul's. There are many weak points in the Roman defences, but they have often been pointed out before, and the flesh-creeping side of the story (Cardinal Vaughan's spiked bracelet, "indecent" passages in works of moral theology, abuse of the confessional, etc.) is not likely to make much impression. Professor Paul claims to write as an Evangelical Protestant. But his definition of theology on page 111 gives him away: "Religion is a 'spiritual thing', as Luther said . . . Theology is the attempt to formulate in words our ideas on that spiritual reality." Here, in spite of the reference, is not the serious Protestantism of the Reformation but that liberalism which is as remote from Luther as it is from Rome.

R. Cant.